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Civilians and Insurance: Approximations of Reality to the Law.  
Guido Rossi, Edinburgh University* 
 
 
Mi mente  
Se aplicó a las simétricas porfías  
Del arte, que entreteje naderías 
(Borges, El remordimiento) 
 
 
1. Premise; 2. The quest for the ‘right’ contractual scheme; 3. Lying on Procrustes’ bed; 4. Concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
1. Premise 
  
‘Italian writers, seeking in Roman law what is not to be found there, got themselves 
entangled in dissertations more likely to fatigue the mind than to enlighten it.’1 With a 
couple of lines written in late eighteenth century, Emerigon dismissed centuries of 
Civilians’ debates (‘Italian’ should perhaps be read as mos italicus) as plain nonsense. 
He was right of course. And yet this article is entirely devoted to such nonsense. It 
does not aim at reconstructing the actual practice of insurance, but the issue faced by 
Civil lawyers. For a Civilian, a contract was valid if supported by Roman law. Some 
support, therefore, had to be found for this new contract. Inconveniently enough, early 
modern insurance had little to do with Roman law, yet it ought to be described 
through Roman categories. In other words, Civil lawyers had to square the circle. 
This paper does not aim at a thorough survey of early modern authors who dealt with 
insurance. There would be little point in that, as there are already excellent studies.2 
Rather, the purpose is to look at the most significant among those ‘mind-fatiguing’ 
dissertations in order to study the approach of Civil lawyers towards a new 
instrument. A first consequence is the choice of authors: medieval jurists will be 
overlooked almost entirely, little attention will be paid to moral theologians,3 and  
                                                 
* I am particularly grateful to John Cairns, Paul du Plessis and David Ibbetson for reading the 
manuscript and giving me precious suggestions. All errors remain obviously my own. 
1 'Les Doctoeurs Italiens, voulant trouver dans le Droit romain ce qui n’y est pas, se sont enveloppés 
dans des dissertations plus capables de fatiguer l’esprit, que de l’eclairer’, Balthazard-Marie 
Emerigon, Traité des assurances et des contrats a la grosse, Marseille, Chez Jean Mossy, Imprimeur du 
roi, 1783, vol. 1, p. 8. 
2  P.G. Pesce, “La dottrina degli antichi moralisti circa la liceità del contratto di assicurazione”, 
Assicurazioni, 33(1) (1966), 36-66; C. Bergfeld, “Die Stellungnahme der spanischen Spätscholastiker 
zum Versicherungsvertrag”, in P. Grossi, ed., La Seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato 
moderno (Milan 1973), 457-471; S.M. Coronas Gonzales, “El Concepto de Seguro en la Doctrina 
Mercantilista de los Siglos XVI y XVII”, in Boletín semestral de derecho privado especial, histórico y 
comparado del Archivo de la Biblioteca Ferran Valls i Taberner, 1 (1988), 243-254; G. Ceccarelli, 
“Risky Business: Theological and Canonical Thought on Insurance from the Thirteenth to the 
Seventeenth Century”, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31(3) (2001), 607-658. 
3 This also means that the so-called contractus trinus (a combination of partnership, sale and insurance) 
will be ignored: hotly debated among moral theologians, it was neglected by Civilians (and, 
incidentally, never heard of in mercantile practice). For a short introduction on this 'triple-contract' see 
however the classic work of J. P. Levy, “Un palliatif a la prohibition de l’husure: le ‘contractus trinus’ 
ou ‘triplex’”, Revue historique de droit français et étranger, Série 4, 18 (1939), 423-433, esp. 425-426, 
and, among the most recent contributions, W. Decock, “In Defense of Commercial Capitalism: Lessius, 
Partnerships and the Contractus Trinus”, SSRN Max Planck Institute for European Legal History 
Research Paper Series, 2012(04), 1-36. 
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business-oriented authors4 will not even be taken into account. Further, chronology 
will not be strictly observed, authors repeating in a few lines what they found 
elsewhere will be normally overlooked, and secondary points will be dismissed. 
Complex debates not immediately related to the systematisation of insurance within 
the Civil law (such as causation and casus fortuitus) will not be mentioned. 
If we accept them for what they are, Civilians’ dissertations on insurance might prove 
fascinating. Far from providing a legal description of commercial reality, they offer 
some interesting insights in the way Civil lawyers filtered reality through the lens of 
Roman law. This ‘approximation’ of reality to the law took place on two distinct but 
complementary levels: first, the contractual category chosen to describe insurance; 
second, its application to actual insurance issues. No general contractual category (i.e. 
no nominate contract) was entirely compatible with insurance on both levels. This 
resulted in much mental gymnastics ('legal convulsions' would perhaps be more 
appropriate). 
We will first examine the main contractual schemes adopted, and then proceed with 
the issues faced by their advocates. Once dealt with the Civilians’ approach in their 
own terms, a short conclusion will seek to assess what reasons moved them.  
 
 
2. The quest for the ‘right’ contractual scheme 
 
2.1. Prologue: the problem of usury. From locatio-conductio to emptio-venditio 
 
Although insurance was practiced almost continuously from antiquity,5 Romans had 
the great advantage not to be devout Christians. It was only in the Middle Ages that 
usury became a significant obstacle to insurance.  
It is trite knowledge that the root of all problems on insurance was the premium: the 
insurer was simply agreeing to cover the value of the merchandise in case of mishap 
against the payment of a sum of money. The premium he received was therefore 
dangerously close to usury: barring mishap, his money would produce more money. 
In the Roman maritime loan (foenus nauticum), the insurer was also a lender. The 
sum lent to the borrower allowed him to furnish his ship or to acquire the goods with 
which he intended trading. The lender would receive back his loan, but only if the 
ship arrived safely at destination. Thus the insurer lent a sum to the merchant and 
assumed the risk of mishap. So, technically, he was not just producing money out of 
his capital. But, because of the risk involved, exorbitant interests were normally 
asked. This prompted pope Gregory IX to issue the famous decretal Naviganti, 
forbading foenus nauticum as usurious.6 The decretal had a momentous effect: in a 
                                                 
4 That is, authors not interested in legal disquisitions. Legal issues might come up in works of writers 
such as Benedetto Cotrugli (or Benedictus de Cotrullis), Gerard Malynes and Jacques Savary (to name 
but a few), but always as a means to a different, more practically-oriented end. 
5 This is particularly the case if one considers the Byzantine developments of the Rhodian Sea Law, 
especially the chreokoinonia (χρεοκοινωνία). For a short and recent overview see O. Maridaki-Karatza, 
“Legal Aspects of the Financing of Trade”, in A.E. Laiou, ed., The Economic History of Bizantium, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, vol. 3, 1117-1120. 
6 X.5.19.19: 'Naviganti vel eunti ad nundinas certam mutuans pecuniae quantitatem pro eo, quod 
suscipit in se periculum, recepturus aliquid ultra sortem, usurarius est censendus.' On the 
interpretation and scope of Naviganti, the number of primary sources is exceedingly vast (and modern 
scholarly literature, boundless). Perhaps the best introduction is that of Martin de Azpilcueta, better 
known as Doctor Navarrus (1492-1586), Commentario resolutorio de usura, Barcelona, en casa de 
Clausio Bornat, 1557, both because it is entirely focused on the decretal (as interpreted by a great 
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short while overt contracts of foenus nauticum virtually disappeared from notarial 
records. 7  If souls were safer, trade was in danger. Naviganti was clear in its 
prohibition, yet its target (the maritime loan) was a two-fold agreement: risk-shifting 
and money-lending.8 Channeling the prohibition to just one part of it would have 
meant saving the other. The more the taint of usury could be put on the loan, the 
easier it would be to rescue the risk-shifting element. In retrospect, it is hardly 
surprising that this is what happened: the two sides of the agreement were both 
logically and technically separable.9 One of the first important attempts to 'rescue' the 
risk-shifting element came from the famed theologian Bartolomeo of San Concordio 
(Bartholomaeus de S. Concordio, 1262-1347), the author of the widely popular 
Summa casuum conscientiae seu Pisanella of 1338.10  Bartolomeo argued that in 
foenus nauticum the lender’s interest had a twofold cause: ratione mutui and ratione 
periculi. While the interest ratione mutui was usurious and condemned by Canon law, 
the interest ratione periculi was legitimate. 
The idea began to gain momentum also among Canon lawyers. A few decades after 
the Pisanella, it was endorsed by one of the greatest Canonists of his time, Francesco 
Zabarella (1360-1417). With Zabarella the passage from maritime loan to modern 
insurance was already fully-fledged: while the loan ought to be condemned, ‘the 
passage of the risk may well be the object of a separate contract’.11 
Focusing on the passage of risk (susceptio periculi) was the key. The problem was the 
legal clothing of such a passage. Not all Canon lawyers were as accommodating as 
Zabarella. In a guise or another, the same objection stood for centuries. As Sinibaldo 
de Fieschi (Sinibaldus de Fieschis, c.1195 – 1254, from 1243 Pope Innocent IV) 
lucidly argued, so long as the thing-at-risk remained with the insured any undertaking 
                                                                                                                                           
number of late medieval and early modern scholars), and for it has the advantage to have been entirely 
translated in English by J. Emery, “Commentary on the Resolution of Money”, Journal of Markets & 
Morality (2004) 7(1), 171-312.  
7 See e.g. the Genoese registers examined by R. Doehaerd, Les Relations Commerciales entre Gênes, la 
Belgique et l'Outremont d’après les Archives Notariales Génoises aux XIIIe et XIVe Siècles, 3 vols., 
Bruxelles, Palais des Académies, 1941, and by L. Liagre-De Sturler, Les Relations Commerciales 
Entre Gênes, la Belgique, et l'Outremont, d'après les Archives Notariales Génoises, 1320 – 1400, 2 
vols., Brussels and Rome, Institute Historique Belge de Rome, 1969. On the practical impact of the 
decretal see the important (but, strangely, seldom quoted) work of G. Mandich, Le pacte de ricorsa et le 
marché italien des changes au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953), 115-163, esp. 115-
132. 
8  See first of all J.P. Van Niekerk, The Development of the Principles of Insurance Law in the 
Netherlands from 1500 to 1800, 2 vols., Cape Town, Juta, 1998, vol. 1, 4-7, and 22-25. 
9 Civilians' approach to foenus nauticum falls way beyond the scope of this work. Glossators did not 
devote too much attention to the subject, yet their analysis is complex enough to discourage rushed 
attempts to provide a brief summary. Suffices to look at Accursius' glosses to D.22.2.1 (Digestum 
vetus, Perusiis, Cayn, 1476, § Traiecticia, fol. 417v) and C.4.33.2 (Codex, Venetiis, Baptista de Tortis, 
1500, § De nautico fenore, fol. 117v; see also ibid., C.4.33.4, § Cum proponas). Postglossators 
followed suit and continued to analyse the two faces of foenus nauticum, yet they did not feel the need 
to separate them in full – as merchants were beginning to. This started the progressive (and incremental) 
forking between law and practice on insurance.  
10 The Summa Pisanella was probably meant as an ‘updating’ of the Summa Confessorum of Johannes 
von Freiburg (d. 1314) to integrate it with the Liber Sextus and the Clementinae. Perhaps because of 
the large number of manuscripts, there is no critical edition of the Pisanella to date. The relevant 
passage on insurance is transcribed in Pesce, note 2, 42, note 3. 
11 'Susceptio periculi bene potest deduci in contractum de se'. While the loan is illegitimate because 
usurious, ‘it is lawful to receive something because of the transfer of the risk’ (‘alias liceret propter 
susceptionem periculi aliquod percipere’). Zabarella, Francisci Zabarellae … Super primo [-quinto] 
Decretalium subtilissima commentaria ..., Venetijs, apud Iuntas, 1602, ad V.19.17, § Naviganti, fol. 
89r. 
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would fall within the scope of Naviganti. To avoid this, there should be a clear 
relationship between the insurer and the thing-at-risk. For instance, continued 
Sinibaldo, if the shipmaster also acted as insurer of the cargo, the agreement would 
not be usurious. In such a case, the insurer would be effectively doing something 
(carrying the merchandise as well as being responsible for its safety) and so he could 
well receive a price for his work.12 The future Innocent IV was a conservative on the 
subject, but his point was, technically speaking, inescapable. Unsurprisingly enough, 
the debate dragged on for centuries.13 So long as the insurer had no direct relationship 
with the thing-at-risk, his undertaking to preserve it against a premium remained 
suspicious.  
This is probably why the first attempts to classify insurance as a nominate (and 
legitimate) contract looked at locatio-conductio. If susceptio periculi was considered 
as labor, then bearing the chance of loss would resemble an actual task. One of the 
first attempts – in truth no more than a hint – was made by the Florentine Dominican 
Piero Strozzi (Petrus Strozzi, 1293-1362).14 Strozzi’s passage was then copied by the 
                                                 
12 Commentaria Innocentii Quarti ... Super Libros Quinque Decretalium, Francofurtum ad Moenum, 
per Martinum Lechler, impensis Hieronimy Feyerabend, 1570, ad V.19.17, § Naviganti, fol. 518v: 
‘fatemur tamen, quod si navigans pretium accipiat, vel aliud, ut pecuniam secum ultra mare deferret, 
ibi sibi redditur, sive periculum in se reciperet, sive non, non esset usura, sed locatio operarum, sed 
ubi non accipit pretium tantum, ut portet, sed negotiatori dat, ut in ea negotietur, haec est usura, quia 
pecuniae nullus est usus, vel utilitas utendi, nec deterioratur utendo […] Periculum et ex hoc dicimus, 
quod si aliquis paratus erat emere merces ad portandum alibi, vel ad servandum certo tempore, quod 
posset inde lucrari, et alius indigens pecunia ad eum veniat, et offerat eandem pecuniam cum lucro 
sperato in loco, quo ire volebat, et in termino se rediturum promittit, usura est contractus huiusmodi, 
nec scio eum excusare, licet alii contradixerint’.  
13 The complex and long debate was in fact very simple. Ultimately, Canon lawyers were perfectly 
conscious of two irreconcilable facts: foenus nauticum was at the same time both useful (and wisely 
regulated by the Romans), and sinful (and expressly forbidden by the Church). This tension is already 
visible – indeed, almost palpable – in the work of the great Canon lawyer Henrico de Susa, cardinal 
Hostiensis (c.1200-1271), Henrici a Segusio Cardinalis Hostiensis, Aurea Summa, Coloniae, 
Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1612, ad V.19.17, n. 3 and 5, c. 1434-35. First, Hostiensis 
briefly condemns the foenus nauticum without exception (ibid., § Quot sunt eius species [n. 3], c. 1434-
35). Then, he provides a lengthy and detailed explanation of its working – with the excuse of 
describing what the Romans did before the Canon law prohibition (ibid., § Ex quibus causis [n. 5], c. 
1435). 
14 Strozzi, Opusculum de Monte, in J. Kirshner (ed.), “Storm over the ‘Monte Comune’: Genesis of 
the Moral Controversy over the Public debt of Florence”, Archivium fratrum praedicatorum 53 (1983), 
219-276, at 268, lines 350-351: ‘Iste enim qui portat mercantias et assecurat, recipit pretium sui 
laboris vel periculi’. The object of Strozzi’s Opusculum was the liceity of Florentine public debt 
obligations (the Monte Comune), and in particular whether the bondholder of a forced loan obligation 
could sell the bond to a third party. It would seem that Strozzi wrote to dispute the argument of the 
Franciscan Francesco of Empoli (Francesco di San Simone da Pisa, 14th century). Francesco sought, in 
classical Franciscan fashion, to distinguish use of money from its possession, and so to allow the 
voluntary resale of the bond. The transferee would thus not step in the transferor’s position, but they 
would remain different from each other. Further - and crucially - he argued that, as repayment of the 
capital is unsure, the interest that the transferee of the bond would receive is licit. Strozzi did not accept 
the distinction between use and possession, and so held that the transferee would replace the transferor 
and become the principal obligee of the forced loan. Accordingly, he could not receive any interest of 
the bond, for that would be usury. For a short summary see Ceccarelli, note 2, 618-619. 
The principle that combining labor with risicum was the key to escape the decretal Naviganti. It 
derived directly from the text of the decretal itself, which put an exception to its prohibition: 'Ille 
quoque, qui dat X. solidos, ut alio tempore totidem sibi grani, vini vel olei mensurae reddantur, quae 
licet tunc plus valeant, utrum plus vel minus solutionis tempore fuerint valiturae, verisimiliter 
dubitatur, non debet ex hoc usurarius reputari. Ratione huius dubii etiam excusatur, qui pannos, 
granum, vinum, oleum vel alias merces vendit, ut amplius, quam tunc valeant, in certo termino recipiat 
pro eisdem; si tamen ea tempore contractus non fuerat venditurus', V.19.17. For a short and 
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Canon lawyer Lorenzo Ridolfi (Laurentius de Rodulphis, 1362-1443) in his Tractatus 
de usuris (1402-1404), who classified insurance as locatio-conductio.15 In describing 
the insurer as the locator (operae),16 Ridolfi sought to distance the agreement from the 
usurious mutuum and to shape it as actual work. It was because of the opus he 
undertook that the insurer-conductor was paid by the insured-locator, not because of a 
purely financial undertaking. By Ridolfi’s times Florentine insurance policies were 
rather open on the nature of the agreement: the insurer simply undertook to pay in 
case of mishap. The scheme envisaged by Ridolfi was therefore a close description of 
reality in Civil law terms: the insurer undertook the opus to warrant for the safety of 
the insured thing.17 It may not be fortuitous that Ridolfi seems to have been the first 
jurist to use the neologism ‘assecurare’, 18  for that was found in coeval Tuscan 
insurance practice. Closeness to reality, however, does not necessarily make things 
stronger in law. The objection of many Canon lawyers, embodied in Sinibaldo’s few 
lines on the subject,19 stood like a Damocles’ sword on the locatio scheme. No legal 
cosmetics could fully justify the premium. If the thing-at-risk remained with the 
insured, the opus was too abstract to cleanse the taint of usury.20 
                                                                                                                                           
particularly insightful example see e.g. Luis Saravia de la Calle (fl. 1544), Instrucion de mercaderes 
muy prouechosa. En la qual se enseña como deven los mercaderes tractar y de que manera se han de 
evitar las usuras de todos los tractos de ventas y compras, Medina del Campo, Pedro de Castro … a 
costa de Antonio de Vrueña, 1547, ch. 8, § Del lucro cessante, fol. 30r.   
15 Ridolfi, Tractatus de usuris, in Zilettus ed., Tractatus illustrium in utraque tum Pontificii, tum 
Caesarei iuris facultate iurisconsultorum, vol. 7, Venetiis, 1584, tertia particula principalis, n. 8, fol. 
38r: ‘Praeterea hic videtur esse potius contractus locationis, quasi ille locet sub suo periculo et cum 
tali mercede conductionem harum mercium ad certas partes’. Cf. E. Spagnesi, "Aspetti 
dell'Assicurazione Medievale”, in E. Spagnesi, G.S. Pene Vidari, and B. Caizzi, L'assicurazione in 
Italia fino all’Unità, Milan, Giuffrè, 1975, 1-189, at 81-82, note 292.  
16 Given the substantial affinity between locatio operis and operarum, it is not easy to qualify the 
insurer as conductor or locator. Apart from Ridolfi, all later advocates of insurance as locatio-
conductio simply wrote about him as ‘assecurator’. It would be somewhat ahistorical (and dogmatic) 
to distinguish sharply between the two kinds of locatio until modern times. Given that medieval 
authors considered locatio operis essentialy a kind of locatio operarum (or rather, they did not see the 
point in any sharp distinction between them), for the present purposes it seems more correct to qualify 
the insurer as locator, just as Ridolfi did. Cf. R. Fiori, La Definizione della ‘Locatio Conductio’. 
Giurisprudenza Romana e Tradizione Romanistica, Naples, Jovene, 1999, esp. 306-308. 
17 It has been suggested that Ridolfi sought to assimilate insurance to locatio-conductio because, in 
open conflict with the Franciscans, he sided against the separation of money's ownership from its use: 
Ceccarelli, note 2, 621. Further, in Ridolfi's treatise the Monte Comune issue comes immediately after 
insurance (both are in his tertia particula principalis; insurance is dealt with until n. 11, fol. 38v, and 
the Monte issue starts immediately thereafter, from n. 12, ibid.). However, while of course this is 
possible, there might be a simpler explanation. Locatio-conductio was the first contractual scheme 
invoked by Canon lawyers and theologians alike, starting at least in the thirteenth century. Already 
Sinibaldo de Fieschi used the locatio scheme to highlight the difference between lawful and usurious 
maritime contracts (supra, note 12). Further, and more importantly, locatio-conductio was an 
extremely broad contractual figure, capable of encompassing nearly any undertaking. The most 
objective description of insurance was the innominate facio ut des, but its the closest approximation as 
a nominate contract was locatio-conductio.  
18 W. Ebel, “Die Anfänge der Rechtswissenshaftlichen Behandlung der Versicherung”, Zeitschrift fur 
die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 49 (1980), 7-20, at 13. 
19 Supra, note 12. 
20 It is no coincidence that the sixteenth century author most fiercely opposed to insurance, Conrad 
Summenhart (1458-1502), effectively applied the same reasoning as Innocent IV to deny legal standing 
to insurance shaped as locatio-conductio: ‘[assecurator] praedictus iustificando contractum 
[assecurati] inducit, quod ibi sit locatio et conductio, modo illa via cessat, quando nullas operas 
[assecurator] apponit circam mercem [assecurati].' It was difficult to consider a mere financial 
undertaking as opus: 'fundamenta cessant assecurans nullas impendit operas'. Summenhart, De 
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The solution was suggested only a few years after Ridolfi by the Genoese Civilian 
Bartolomeo Bosco (Bartholomeus de Bosco, d.1433/37). Bosco fully accepted 
Sinibaldo’s point – in order for the contract to be lawful, the thing-at-risk must pass to 
the insurer. And so it did: for Bosco, insurance was a particular case of emptio-
venditio. The insurance contract was a conditional sale of the merchandise shipped: in 
case of safe arrival at destination, the sale was void. 21 The whole mechanism was 
obviously thought as a way to use the principle res perit domino. The insurer would 
pay out because he was the dominus rei. This classification did not justify the 
premium but that was a minor issue, for it was not put in the contract and often paid in 
advance. The problem was how to force the insurer to honour his undertaking in the 
event of mishap without letting him bring up the usury question. At least, this was the 
main problem for learned jurists. From their perspective, the idea of a straightforward 
contract of sale solved many issues.  
It is not clear whether Bosco was the first jurist to shape insurance as conditional sale. 
In the relevant passages of his consilia on the subject he never quotes any auctoritas 
other than Roman law texts. It is just possible that Bosco gave legal form to the 
thought of another theologian. Just as Ridolfi looked at Strozzi, so the possibility 
cannot be excluded that Bosco was influenced by the reflections on usurious contracts 
of Bernardino of Siena (St. Bernardinus Senensis, 1380-1444). Bernardino founded 
his argument on the same principle as Sinibaldo de Fieschi: only a clear, strong link 
between the insurer and the thing-at-risk would cleanse the contract from usury. 
Locatio-conductio would not do: the object of the insurer’s locatio was not the thing, 
only the risk that it would perish. Hence, Bernardino thought of emptio-venditio. This 
would give the insurer ownership of the thing-at-risk: the strongest possible relation.22 
In any case, it is not fortuitous that the sale model was envisaged – or brought to 
general attention – by a Genoese jurist. Unlike in Ridolfi’s Florence, in Bosco’s 
Genoa the policy was typically shaped as a fictitious sale of goods, sold by the 
insured to the insurer, of the same value as the thing-at-risk, whose payment was 
                                                                                                                                           
Contractibus licitis, atqve illicitis, Tractatus, Venetiis, apud Bernardum Iunctam, 1580, tract. 3, q. 71, 
p. 321. 
21 Bosco, Consilia egregij Domini Bartholomei de Bosco ..., Lodani, apvd Franciscvm Castellvm, 
1620, cons. 369, n. 2, p. 570: ‘assecuratio est contractus vltro citro obligatorius, quaestuarius, saepius 
reiterabilis, et est contractus emptionis, vt apparet ex verbis contractus, quibus statur C. de proba. L. 
ad probationem utilis dominii [C.4.19.21] et C. de solutione l. interesse puto [D.41.2.39] et de evic. L. 
cum tibi liberum [C.8.44.22] et ex substantialitate: nam si contingeret res, vel merces, super quibus 
facta est assecuratio, perdi, assecuror soluit pretium, et valorem, pro quo assecurauit, et recuperat 
merces, quae sunt suo periculo a se emptae, si recuperari possunt, propter quod modus faciendi istas 
securitates inuentus est per viam venditionis sub conditione resoluendae, sicut videmus in l. 2 ff. de in 
diem adiec. Cum ibi not. [D.18.2.1] Vnde Marcus assecurando emit, arriscauit, contractauit, siue 
contraxit, quae omnia potuit facere secundum tenorem dicti instrumenti. Et sic videtis, hanc rem esse 
indubitabilem.' 
22 Bernardinus Senensis, Quadragesimale de Evangelo aeterno, in Id., Sancti Bernardini Senensis … 
Opera Omnia, Lvdgvni, vol. 2, 1650, De Contractibus usurariorum, Sermo 39, p. 249: ‘dubium vel 
periculum a foenore non excusat, nisi apud lucrantem includatur dominium atque usus rei periclitantis, 
cum qua lucratur. Primo quidem dominium, quia ex re sua homo lucrati debet. Secundo usus, quia 
usus rei ex quo lucrum provenit, debet mediate, vel immediate ad lucrantem pertinere.’ While a clear 
link between Bernardino’s Quadragesimale and Bosco’s consilia is unlikely (the insurance-related 
consilia of Bosco deal with policies of the mid-1420s, whereas the Quadragesimale was written only 
during the last years of the 1430s), a looser influence of Bernardino’s thought may not be excluded. He 
was appointed official preacher of the Observant Friars (reformed Franciscans) as early as 1405, and 
his sermons enjoyed great notoriety even before they were published in the Quadragesimale. 
Bernardino’s first voyage to Genoa dates to the late 1410s: A.M. da Venezia, Vita di San Bernardino 
da Siena, Siena, Calcografia Editrice, 1854, lib. 1, cap. 12, 77. 
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conditional upon the safe arrival of the ship at its destination. If the ship arrived 
safely, the insured-seller would forfeit the payment for the goods he allegedly sold to 
the insurer-buyer; if the ship sank, he would be entitled to claim it. It is possible that 
Bosco looked at the mercantile practice of his city and then described it in Civil law 
terms, just as Ridolfi did in Florence. Bosco, however, sought to provide a stronger 
legal structure to his scheme. He could not possibly ground his reconstruction upon a 
blatantly fictitious sale of goods that – by a fortuitous coincidence – were of the very 
same value as the insured cargo. Hence, the fictional nature of the sale contract linked 
to the value of the insured thing was best ignored. It was safer to argue for a single 
contract of conditional sale, seemingly inspired by the similar market practice.23  
 
 
2.2. Emptio-venditio: from selling the thing-at-risk to selling the risk in the thing 
 
Bosco was an influential lawyer, and his two consilia (at least, among those printed) 
devoted to insurance date to the mid-1420s. It is, however, only towards the end of 
the century that the same emptio-venditio scheme was re-elaborated in what became 
the first and most influential treatise on the subject. The Tractatus de 
assecurationibus et sponsionibus mercatorum of the Portuguese jurist, Pedro de 
Santarém (c.1460-?), better known as Santerna, was probably written in the late 1480s 
(the earliest extant manuscript is of 148824 ), but it was printed only in 1552.25 
‘Obscure’ in the words of the Genoese Rota26 and unsystematic in the eyes of the 
modern reader, Santerna’s treatise was however enormously influential. 
According to Santerna, insurance is ‘the agreement whereby one bears the mishap of 
another against the price of the risk’. 27  Strictly speaking, the agreement is an 
innominate contract in the form of facio ut des: the insurer bears the risk so that the 
insured pays the premium (‘suscipio periculum ut des pecuniam’). 28  The insurer 
accepts to bear the risk of a mishap, not the mishap itself. The contract is conditional, 
for the payment depends on the event of mishap. ‘The contract of insurance is shaped 
this way: if it happens that your merchandise be lost during the sea-voyage […] I 
                                                 
23 Cf. Coronas Gonzales, note 2, 251. The overwhelming majority of scholars seem to have read 
Genoese practice through the lens of Bosco and other later learned jurists to the point of ignoring the 
actual text of Genoese policies. So, it is very common today to find accounts of insurance shaped as a 
fictitious sale in the very same way as Bosco described them, thus missing entirely the subtle 
difference between practice and theorisations. The first authors who stressed the point, in the first half 
of the twentieth century, went more or less unheard: G. Valeri, “L’archivio Datini e gli studi storici di 
diritto commerciale attraverso il documento del 1329”, Rivista del Diritto Commerciale 26 (1928), 
601-641, at 442; L. Piattoli, “ La Scritta di Sicurtà Genovese e una Speciale Scritta dei Mercanti 
Fiorentini in Genova Attraverso i Documenti dell'Archivio Datini”, Assicurazioni, rivista di diritto, 
economia e finanza delle assicurazioni private 6 (1939), 164-180, at 173. 
24 MS Vat. Lat. 5922; D. Maffei, “Il giureconsulto portoghese Pedro de Santarém autore del primo 
trattato sulle assicurazioni (1488),” in Estudos em Homenagem aos Profs. Manuel Paulo Merêa e 
Guilherme Braga de Cruz, Boletim da faculdade de Direito de Coimbra, número especial (1983), 703-
728, at 716.  
25 Petri Santernae Lusitani iuris utrius doct. peritissimi ac famosissimi, Tractatus de assecurationibus 
et sponsionibus mercatorum: nunc primum in lucem datus, cum repertorio et summarijs, Venetiis, apud 
Baltassarem Constantinum, 1552. 
26 M. Bellone, ed., Decisiones Rotae Genuae De Mercatura et pertinentibus ad eam ..., Venetiis [apud 
Franciscum Zilettum], 1582, dec. 166, n. 4, fol. 221v. 
27 Santerna, note 25, pt. 1, n. 2, fol. 3v: ‘conventio, quia unus infortunium alterius in se suscepit pretio 
periculi convento’. 
28 Ibid., pt. 1, n. 7, fol. 4v. 
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promise to pay its value, so that you pay me [i.e. the premium].’ 29  Santerna is 
therefore describing a financial undertaking which does not involve any transfer of 
ownership or possession: the cargo remains with its owner, the insured, and the 
insurer simply vouches for its safety. Yet, this guarantee clearly comes at a price – the 
insurance premium. For the insurer is just agreeing to cover the value of the 
merchandise in case of mishap against the payment of a sum of money. The sum he 
receives is therefore dangerously close to usury. Santerna was well aware that the 
facio ut des scheme was the most obvious, but not the safest. It could not shelter the 
insurance from usury accusations, for the facio of the insurer was just a conditional 
undertaking against the actual des, the unconditional payment of a sum of money. If 
the ship arrived safely at destination, the insurer would pocket the premium without 
doing anything. His conditional promise to use his money (to pay for the mishap) 
earned him some more money – a straightforward case of usury. This is why Santerna 
looked at the scheme of emptio-venditio. The insurance contract, argued the 
Portuguese author, ‘may be assimilated to the sale and purchase contract because of 
the price paid for the risk’.30  
Whether other jurists wrote in support of the emptio-venditio scheme between Bosco 
and Santerna, we do not know. Nor do we know of any direct link between the two 
authors – at least, Santerna never quotes Bosco. Yet it may not be excluded that 
Santerna, who spent long years in Italy, was influenced by Bosco’s reconstruction. 
The difference between the two authors – and, more generally, between Bosco and 
nearly all the later jurists who used the emptio-venditio model to describe insurance, 
lay in the object of the sale: no longer the thing-at-risk, but the risk that it would 
perish.31 Although perhaps not as watertight a solution than one might think at first,32 
                                                 
29  Ibid., pt. 3, n. 2-4 fol. 19v: ‘iste contractus assecurationis est contractus conditionalis […] 
Concepitur enim contractus assecurationis hoc modo: si contingat in hac navigatione res tuas sive 
merces deperdi […] ego promitto valorem tuarum mercium: et hoc, dummodo mihi des.’ 
30  Ibid., pt. 1, n. 7, fol. 4v:‘assimiletur emptioni venditioni propter pretium quod datur ratione 
periculi'. 
31 There were some exceptions, but they did not meet with particular success. One of the main ones 
came from the famed nominalist theologian Juan de Medina (1490-1546). As Bosco, Medina used the 
emptio-venditio scheme to circumvent the problem of the premium given for the susceptio periculi. 
Unlike Bosco, however, Medina was still thinking in terms of foenus nauticum, so that the undertaking 
he had in mind retained both its functions – financing and risk-shifting. Substantially, therefore, 
Medina's scheme was a variation on the theme of maritime loan – with the obvious advantage that it 
fell outside the scope of the usurious loan. The difference with the standard foenus lay in that the 
merchant-insured did not borrow money from the insurer-lender so to purchase the merchandise, but 
bought it directly from the insurer-buyer with a forward sale contingent to the safe arrival at 
destination. Under this contract, the merchant-buyer asked the insurer-seller to pay for the purchased 
cargo later, and only if it reached safely its destination. The agreement shifted the risk from the buyer 
to the seller, thereby inverting the principle res perit domino. And for this reason the seller was entitled 
to receive an extra – the insurance premium. Ioannis Medinae … De Poenitentia, Restitutione, Et 
Contractibus Praeclarum Et Absolutum Opus, vol. 2, Ingolstadii, ex Officina Typographica Davidis 
Sartorii, 1581, q. 38, causae 1-4, p. 228-235, esp. causa 3, p. 233, lit. a, n. 3: 'in casu Decretalis 
[X.5.19.19] mutuans inducebat mutuatarium, ut sibi aliquid daret pro eo, quod mutuator periculum in 
se susciperet, nec [mutuans] volebat aliter mutuare, et ideo non gratis mutuare volebat, sed cum lucro, 
quod ex assecuratione sperabat. In nostro autem casu, venditor non volens suscipit periculum pretij 
expectati, sed ad instantiam emptoris: emptor enim petit a venditore, ut vendat illi mercem ad 
terminum, et pro pretio solvendo ei tempus aliquod concedat; quod si venditor annuat, precium mercis 
periculo exponit […] Et ita emptor venditorem inducens, ut ad terminum vendat, ex consequenti eum 
inducit, ut valorem, seu pretium mercis periculo exponat: quod tamen venditor gratis facere non 
tenetur. In casu autem Decretalis mutuatarius non inducit mutuantem, ut rem suam cum periculo 
mutuet, sed potius ipse mutuans praevenit, et mutuatarium compellit, ut si vult mutuatum obtinere, 
illum secundum contractum assecurationis secum ineat.' 
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the fictional sale had obvious advantages. But it was probably too far-fetched to 
describe overt policies, where the undertaking was expressly described in terms of 
insurance. Only the Genoese stuck to their obscure policies, while most of other 
merchants insured openly. If the policy focused on the passage of the risk (and not of 
the property of the thing-at-risk), jurists had to find a legal mechanism to justify that.  
In shaping insurance as emptio-venditio Santerna describes the insurer as the buyer: 
‘he who underwrites against a premium is said to purchase the chance of mishap’.33 
Buying and selling the risk in a thing is a remarkably modern idea. We often say, 
especially in economic literature, that the insured ‘buys’ insurance. Yet, Santerna 
does exactly the opposite than one would expect. For him, it is the insurer who buys 
the risk. While the choice of emptio-venditio offered clear advantages to Santerna, it 
is not immediately obvious why the insurer had to be described as the buyer of the 
risk. Once again, the problem lay in the premium, the pretium periculi. What Santerna 
could not say was that the insurer accepted to bear the periculum for a price. To avoid 
that, he sought to focus as much as possible on the periculum, describing its pretium 
as merely ancillary. As the object of the sale is the eventum periculi, the pretium 
periculi is an accessory element to the transfer of the risk of such eventum.34 Santerna 
played with the ambiguity of the term ‘periculum’, which could refer either to the risk 
that the goods insured were lost or to the payment of their value in case of loss. The 
key-text is a well known passage in the Digest (D.22.2.5 pr.):35 
                                                                                                                                           
32 In the absence of further elaborations on Bosco's scheme, the boundaries of the liability of the 
insurer-buyer remained ill defined. The thing-at-risk was sold but never delivered to the insurer. So the 
principle res perit a domino was not fully applicable. While it would have sufficed for the proper casus 
fortuitus, it might have proven more problematic when the mishap derived from negligence – say, of 
the shipmaster, to whom the seller-insured had entrusted the thing. Cf. e.g. Sebastiano de' Medici 
(d.1595), Tractatus De Fortuitis Casibus, Coloniae Agrippinae, Ex Officina Ioannis Gymnici, 1596, pt. 
1, q. 16, n. 20, p. 149. The issue is rather complex (and, moreover, speculative) and it depends on the 
definition of casus fortuitus, which falls beyond the scope of the present work. 
33 Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 13, fol. 17r: ‘qui assecurationem facit propter pretium, dicitur emere 
eventum periculi'. 
34 The problem was illustrated clearly by Antonio Perez, (1583-1672), Ant. Perezi, Praelectiones in 
Codicem Justinianeum, Amstelodami, Sumptibus Anthoni Jacobi, 1645, ad C.4.33. n. 6, p. 192: ‘Plane 
idem jus est terreni foenoris, quod maritimi, veluti si creditor convenerit de suscipiendo periculum 
pecuniae transuehendae, per loca periculosa, et praedonum infidiis infestissima; cum utrobique militet 
eadem juris ratio, fundata in periculi susceptione […] Haec tamen excusatio non placet Gregorio IX 
Pontifici, in cap. 19 De usur. [X.5.19.19] ubi dicit creditorem non posse etiam ratione periculi suscepti 
in se, supra sortem, sine nota usurarum quippiam accipere: sed commode accipi potest de illo casu, 
quo praetexitur periculum, ubi nullum est, vel majus quam subset, sic ut lucrum maius sit ipso 
periculo.’ 
35 As the translation provided in the text diverges from most vernacular translations, it is important to 
provide the full text of D.22.2.5 pr. (from Scaevola’s Liber sextus responsorum), from the Mommsen 
and Krueger’s edition: ‘Periculi pretium est et si condicione quamvis poenali non existente recepturus 
sis quod dederis et insuper aliquid praeter pecuniam, si modo in aleae speciem non cadat: veluti ea, ex 
quibus condictiones nasci solent, ut "si non manumittas", "si non illud facias", "si non convaluero" et 
cetera. Nec dubitabis, si piscatori erogaturo in apparatum plurimum pecuniae dederim, ut, si cepisset, 
redderet, et athletae, unde se exhiberet exerceretque, ut, si vicisset, redderet.’ Many interpolations 
have been suggested over the time, but most of them have no serious grounds, and they will not be 
considered here. Assuming the text is genuine, the translation provided above diverges on two main 
points from most translations. First, scholars read separately the conjuctions ‘et si’ at the beginning of 
the text. The resulting translation would seem to exclude penal bonds (‘… et, si condicione quamvis 
poenali non existente, recepturus sis quod dederis…’) without any clear reason for that. This, 
incidentally, would strengthen the interpretation of ‘aliquid praeter pecuniam’ as ‘something else 
besides money’ (as in the translation edited by A. Watson, The Digest of Justinian, Philadephia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, revised edition, 1998, vol. 1), which is rather misleading. Second, 
most translations consider the subordinate ‘si modo in aleae speciem non cadat’ as excluding aleatory 
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One may recover what he has given, as well as something more, as compensation for 
bearing the chance of loss (pretium periculi), even if there is no penal clause, so long as 
the event is not a modal clause 
 
The text refers to foenus nauticum, and so to an actual loan repayable upon condition 
that the ship arrives safely at destination. The insurer is also a lender, hence the 
reference to the recovering of what was given. Because of the foenus nauticum 
context, the term ‘pretium periculi’ encompassed both the interest and the money lent 
(by the insurer-creditor to the insured-debtor) to buy the goods insured. The object of 
the contract, therefore, was not only a risk, but also a sum of money equivalent to the 
value of the goods. 
In a proper insurance context, the insurer does not lend any money. Adjusting the text 
accordingly, the insurer receives a sum of money as ‘compensation for bearing the 
chance of loss if the risk does not materialise’. This means that the insurer may retain 
the premium if the mishap does not occur. 36  In this context, the term ‘pretium 
periculi’ is used both in its meaning of risk for which a price has been paid (and so 
the accent is on periculum) and in that of price given to accept the risk (and so the 
accent is on pretium). It follows that the same term can be used for both parties of the 
insurance contract: the insured pays a pretium to pass on the periculum, which the 
insurer accepts. Receiving the pretium periculi, the insurer is therefore accepting both 
price and risk. If we translate this into the emptio-venditio scheme, it is possible to 
                                                                                                                                           
contracts. However, foenus nauticum itself is an aleatory contract. Moreover, Scaevola’s passage ends 
with two examples that are unquestionably aleatory contracts: the loan to the fisherman to buy his 
equipment, and that to the athlete training for a competition. In both cases Scaevola states that there is 
no doubt that the lender can recover the loan (with interest) if the fisherman catches some fish or if the 
athlete wins the competition. The ‘aleae speciem’ in the sentence must have given some trouble to 
glossators as well, for the Accursian Gloss reads ‘aliam speciem’ and explains that such ‘other species’ 
refers to other contracts, different from foenus nauticum, such as the innominate ‘do ut facias vel non 
facias’ (Accursius, note 8, ad D.22.2.4 pr., § Speciem, fol. 322r). What might have troubled the 
Glossators was the reference to alea, precisely because foenus nauticum is aleatory. Rather, the 
sentence ‘si modo in aleae speciem non cadat’ seems to refer to modal conditions, just as the examples 
immediately following the sentence – and clearly related to it through the adverb ‘veluti’ – seem to do 
(‘veluti ea, ex quibus condictiones nasci solent, ut "si non manumittas", "si non illud facias", "si non 
convaluero" et cetera.’). This interpretation is hardly new: see e.g. Guillaume Maran (1546 - 1621), 
Guilielmi Marani … Opera Omnia, seu Paratitla Digestorum …, Trajecti ad Rhenum, apud Joannem 
Broedelet, 1741, ad D.22.2, p. 204. But it is not popular among scholars. Among its most recent critics 
see P. Thomas, “Insurance in Roman law: Martialis Epigrammaton II 52”, 2 Journal of South African 
Law (2009), 268-270, arguing that the Romans distinguished between aleatory contracts and pure 
wagers. As such, the ‘aleae speciem’ should be referred to simple wagers, and not to aleatory contracts. 
The point clearly has some merit. But it is doubtful whether the Roman who played dice had to pay in 
advance, so the restrictive clause (‘si modo in aleae speciem non cadat’) would ill fit into the general 
statement ‘recepturus sis quod dederis’. Thomas seems to find confirmation of his argument in the 
writing of Gerhard Noodt (1647-1725), who made a distinction between aleatory contracts with a 
socio-economic function (such as insurance itself) and mere wagers, extremely common (and 
prohibited) at his time. Noodt, “Gerardi Noodt … De Foenore et Usuris Libri Tres …”, lib. 2, ch. 7, in 
Id., Opera Omnia … In Duos Tomos Distributa …, Ludguni Batavorum, apud Johannem Arnoldum 
Langerak, 1735, vol. 1,  p. 218-219. The problem is that the distinction between ‘useful’ aleatory 
contracts and ‘sterile’ wagers is a late medieval and early modern one, developed in the attempt to 
justify insurance despite the usurious nature of foenus nauticum. 
36  Cf. Scaccia, Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio, Romae, Sumptibus Andreae Brugiotti, Ex 
Typographia Iacobi Mascardi, 1619, Comm., ∫ 1 q. 1, n. 2, n. 131, p. 36: 'mercibus manentibus salvis, 
id, quo pro suscepto periculo accepit, [assecurator] non tenebitur restituere, et hanc esse communem 
Doctorum approbatam sententiam’. 
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consider the insurer as the buyer of the periculum against a certain pretium, and 
conversely the insured as the seller of the pretium to pass on the periculum.  
Because of the ambiguity of the pretium periculi, each party could be regarded as 
buyer or as seller. The same Santerna, having initially described the insurer as buyer 
(of the periculum),37 then changes perspective and considers the insured as buyer (of 
the indemnity).38 After Santerna, however, most authors preferred to focus only on the 
indemnity as the object of the contract (and not also on the periculum). This way, the 
insurer was considered only as seller and the insured only as buyer. An obvious 
explanation for this might lie in its simplicity – it is more intuitive to consider the 
insured ‘buying’ security rather than ‘selling’ the risk. But perhaps the reason lies in 
the progressive acceptance of insurance as a lawful contract. So long as some doubts 
were still lingering on the usurious nature of insurance, ‘selling’ security was 
somewhat dangerous. It was close to vouching for the safety of the thing in exchange 
for a sum of money – precisely the ‘weak’ locatio scheme of Ridolfi. By contrast, 
‘buying’ the periculum was conceptually more distant from that, and therefore safer. 
This is probably why Santerna himself described the object of the sale first of all in 
terms of periculum (and so with the insurer as buyer), and only later also in the more 
realistic terms of indemnity (where the insurer is the seller). Santerna was writing in 
the late fifteenth century. In all probability, he still perceived the accusation of usury 
as a serious (or at least possible) threat to insurance. By the second half of the 
sixteenth century, few Civilians still regarded the decretal Naviganti as a menace. At 
least, by then the description of insurance in terms of emptio-venditio was widely 
considered more than sufficient to shield insurance from usury accusations. So, it was 
enough to apply the simple scheme of sale and purchase: if the insurer receives a 
payment, then he is surely the seller, and if the insured pays the premium, then he is 
surely the buyer. This was the approach chosen by Benvenuto Stracca (1509-1578), in 
his highly influential treatise on insurance (1569).39 Some years later Lenaert Leys 
(Leonardus Lessius, 1554-1623) summed up Stracca's argument with a definition 
soon to become the standard one on the subject:40 
 
If one insures against a price he is selling his obligation, for he undertakes to pay the 
value of the thing in case it perished, and the counterparty – that is, the insured – is 
buying the same obligation.  
 
Lessius’ definition was then followed verbatim by some of the most influential Civil 
lawyers who wrote on insurance, such as Sigismondo Scaccia (1568-1618) and 
                                                 
37 Supra, note 33. 
38 Santerna, note 25, pt. 4, n. 45, fol. 43r: ‘Item dominus mercium propter pretium periculi quod dat, 
videtur emere aestimationem suarum mercium’. 
39 Clarissimi Iurisc. Benvenuti Stracchae, De Assecurationibus, Tractatus, Venetiis, 1569, praefatio, n. 
8 and 35, fols. 12r, and 22r-v respectively (cf. also ibid., gl. 6, n. 6, fols. 12r and 54r). On the probable 
influence of Santerna on Stracca, especially on the issue, cf. Santerna, note 25, pt. 1, n. 7, fol. 4v. 
Instead of writing a general treatise on insurance, Stracca glossed a policy of his city, Ancona. The 
policy has been recently translated in English: D. Kriel, “A 16th Century Insurance Policy”, 8 (2002) 
Fundamina, 133-136. A short but analytical comment on it may be read in F. Mansutti, “La polizza di 
sicurtà anconitana del 1567 nel 'De assecurationibus' di Benvenuto Stracca”, 76 (2009) Assicurazioni, 
rivista di diritto, economia e finanza delle assicurazioni private, 403-406.  
40 Leys, De Iustitia et Iure Ceterisque Virtutibus Cardinalibus Libri Quattuor, Lovanii, Masij, 1605, 
lib. 2, cap. 28, dub. 4, n. 24, p. 324: ‘qui enim pretio assecurat, videtur vendere suam obligationem, 
qua se obligat ad solvendum rei aestimationem, in eventum quo perierit, et alter hanc videtur emere’. 
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Francesco Rocco (1605-1676).41  Despite its success, as we will see, the formula 
contained the seeds of the most significant limitations to the emptio-venditio scheme. 
 
 
2.3. From locatio to fideiussio  
 
The emptio-venditio was probably the most successful scheme on insurance both in 
terms of adherents and of longevity, but it was not the only one. The locatio-
conductio scheme, in all probability the first to be used for insurance, had its 
influential advocates throughout the early modern period.42  A number of authors 
referred generically to susceptio periculi as the object of the insurance, without 
specifying whether such a susceptio was a sui generis undertaking (and so an 
innominate contract) or it fell within the scheme of a nominate contract. 43  It is 
possible that some of them implicitly thought of a nominate contract, in which case 
the most obvious candidate should be (at least in principle) locatio-conductio. 
Nonetheless, the locatio scheme never had many followers. Initially, perhaps because 
it was not safe. Describing the susceptio periculi in terms of operae meant 
highlighting the actual task, and so the (usurious) warranty. Later on, because it paved 
the way to fideiussio. Once it became common to qualify insurance in terms of 
nominate contracts, some jurists began to look at the content of the insurer’s 
obligation more closely, focusing on the warranty function of his undertaking. Since 
the insurer vouched for the thing to arrive at destination, they argued, his role was 
closer to that of a guarantor (fideiussor) than a locator (let alone a seller). Thus, the 
indemnity (or rather, the undertaking to indemnify) could be sold as emptio-venditio 
or more simply promised (in terms of guarantee) as fideiussio.44  
                                                 
41 Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1, n. 128, p. 35 (cf. also ∫ 1, q. 7, pt. 3, lim. 6, n. 5, p. 440); Rocco, De 
Assecurationibus, in Id., Responsorum legalium cum decisionibus centuria secunda ac mercatorum 
notabilia in sex titulos distributa, Neapoli, ex Typographia Lucae Antonij Fusci, sumptibus Iacobi 
Antonii Bagnuli, 1655, not. 3, n. 7, p. 393. Cf. Van Niekerk, note 8, 190-191. 
42 At the beginning of the sixteenth century locatio-conductio was the scheme chosen in the greatly 
influential work of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio (Sylvester Prierias, 1456/7-1523), Su[m]ma 
Summarum que Syluestrina dicitur, Argentiorati, Opera [et] Impensis … Johannis G[r]ieninger, 1518, 
§ Negotium, q. 5, fol. 344v. Towards the end of the century another important jurist did as much, 
Giovanni Battista Lupo (1533-1611), De usuris et commerciis illicitis commentarii quatuor …, 
Venetia, apud Lucantonium Giuntam, 1577, Commentarius tertius, § 1, n. 18, fol. 96r. In the early 
seventeenth century, one of the most important jurists specialising in commercial matters opted for the 
same scheme (explaining it in greater detail). Juan de Hevia Bolaño (c.1570-1623), Laberinto de 
Commercio terrestre y naval, Madrid, por Luis Sanchez impressor del Rey n. s. a su costa, y de 
Geronimo de Courbes, 1619, lib. 3, ch. 14, n. 2, p. 652. 
43 This was especially common among moral theologians. See e.g. Francisco de Vitoria (c.1483-1546), 
De Iustitia, (V. Beltrán de Heredia, ed., Madrid, Publicaciones de la Asociacion Francisco de Vitoria, 
1934, tomo 4, De iustitia, qq. 67-88, quest. 78, art. 2 p. 634, and Juan de Lugo (Iohannis de Lugo, 
1583-1660), R. P. Ioannis de Lvgo … Disputationvm de Ivstitia et Ivre, vol. 2, Ludgvni, Sumpt. 
Laurentii Arnaud, et Petri Borde, 1670, disp. 31, sect. 6 (rectius, sect. 7), p. 447. Further literature in 
Pesce, note 2, 54-62.  
44 It is not surprising, then, if one of the clearest definitions of insurance as fideiussio came from a 
jurist who considered insurance as emptio-venditio. Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 3, gl. 3, n. 29, p. 622: ‘qui enim 
assecurat, stat veluti fideiussor mercium, et pecuniarum adversus quemcumque casum sinistrum, et 
quia pro illo periculo accipit pretium, dicitur vedere illud periculum, et dominus pecuniae, alterius 
mercis assecuratae, quia solvit pretium periculi, dicitur emere illud periculum [...] et ei, qui, 
fideiubendo, se periculo exponit, deberi periculi pretium’. 
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Fideiussio had the clear advantage of being legitimate – the recompense of the 
guarantor was not usurious. 45  Indeed, many Scholastics of the Salamanca school 
approved of it – a clear sign of its moral legitimacy. Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) 
was one of the first to write of the insurer as fideiussor, albeit in passing46 The parallel 
proved popular, and it spread soon also among more legally-minded authors, 47 
reaching even eminent law courts.48 It was one thing, however, to allude to the insurer 
as fideiussor; it was another to describe insurance fully in terms of fideiussio. The 
majority of jurists used the parallel with fideiussio to underline the warranty function 
of the susceptio periculi, but then moved on to classify insurance – typically – as 
emptio-venditio. 
In its fully-fledged version, the parallel with fideiussio had few enthusiasts, who were 
mainly Spanish scholars. The first thorough reflection on insurance as fideiussio was 
proposed by Bartolomé de Albornoz in his Arte de los Contractos (1573).49 The main 
                                                 
45  Probably the clearest explanation of this point is in Luis Lopez (d.1596), Instructionum 
negotiantium duobus contentum libris, Salamanticae, excudebat Cornelius Bonardus, 1589, p. 356: 
‘Patet etiam, quia assecurator est veluti quidam fideiussor: sed fideiussor pro fideiussione secundum 
communem sententiam potest  aliquid accipere: ergo et merus assecurator’. See also, and especially, 
ibid., p. 361: ‘Tantem aduertito lector, quod quia fideiussio quodammodo quidam modus est 
assecurationis, ideo diximus absque vsura posse fideiussorem aliquid recipere a debitore, quia hic 
mutuum tacitum, vel expressum non est inuenire, cum fideiussor hic nihil praeter fidem cautionis 
praestet, et quia ratione obligationis qua astringitur periculum, et onus soluendi subire, si debitor 
principalis soluendo non fuerit, aliquam retributionem moderatam meretur.’ It may be useful to add 
that Lopez's work is nowadays typically cited in its 1593 edition with a different title (Lodovici Lopez 
Tractatus de contractibus et negotiationibus, Lugdunum, Ex Officina Iuntarum, 1593), but in many 
parts it hardly differs from his Instructionum of 1589. In particular, the section on insurance is 
reproduced verbatim (in the 1593 work it may be read in lib. 2, ch. 16, p. 121-132). 
46 De Soto, Fratris Dominici Soto … De iustitia et iure Libri decem, Salamanticae, Excudebat Ioannes 
Baptista a Terranoua, 1569, lib. 6, q. 7, p. 536, lib. 6, q. 7, p. 536: ‘licitum est fideiubendi pro alio, 
quem non est adeo tutum solvendo fore, aliquid pro illo periculo suscipere cui se exponit solvendi. 
Persimile autem contingit in assecuratione.’ 
47 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, praefatio, n . 45 fols. 25v-26r; Lupo, note 42, Commentarius 
tertius, § 1, n. 16, fol. 96r; Miguel Bartolomé Salón (1539-1621), Controversiae de justitia et jure, 
atque de contractibus et commerciis humanis, licitis ac illicitis …, Venetiis, apud Baretium Baretium 
Bibliopolam, 1608, vol. 2, § Disputatio de Contractu Assecurationis, art. 1, n. 3, p. 677; Scaccia, note 
36, § 3, gl. 3, n. 29, pp. 621-622; Rocco, note 41, not. 91 n. 347, p. 418; Acacius Antonio de Ripoll 
(c.1475-1555), De Magistratus Logiae Maris antiquitate … Tractatus, Barcinonae, Ex Praelo Antonij 
Lacavalleria, 1655, ch. 21, n. 124, p. 231; Ansaldo Ansaldi (Ansaldus de Ansaldis, 1651-1719), De 
commercio et mercatura, discursus legales, Romae, ex Typographia Dominici Antonij Herculis, 1689, 
disc. 70 n. 12, p. 428; Medina, note 31, q. 38, causa 3, p. 230 lit. f, and p. 231, n. 2. 
48 Bellone, note 26, dec. 25 n. 6, fol. 89r; Juan Pedro Fontanella (1575-1649), Sacri Regii Senatvs 
Cathaloniae Decisiones, per Ioannem Petrvm Fontanella [...] elaborata, vol. 1, Barcinone, ex Praelo, ac 
aere Petri Lacavalleria, in via Bibliopolarum, 1639, vol. 1, dec. 243, n. 23, p. 597 [Similarly, in the 
early seventeenth century the Senate of Barcelona considered the insurers ‘fideiussores indemnitatis’]; 
Alvaras Valasco (1526-1593), D. Alvari Valasci … Decisiones Consultationum ac Rerum iudicatarum 
in Regno Lusitaniae, In Bibliopolio Commeliniano, 1607, lib. 1, consult. 18, proem., n. 1-2, 4 and 6, p. 
87-91. This last consultatio is of particular interest, for it was entirely based on the assumption that 
insurance is truly a form of fideiussio. The conceptual closeness between fideiussio and insurance may 
be seen in other law courts as well see e.g. Cesare Manenti (fl. 1612), Decisiones Sacri Senatus 
Mantuani, Venetiis, apud Antonium Pinellum Impressorem Ducalem, 1622, dec. 54, n. 51, p. 214; 
Cesare Barzi (1542-1605), Decisiones Almae Rotae Bononiensis, Venetiis, apud Haeredem Damiani 
Zenarij, 1610, dec. 24, preamble and n. 1-6, pp. 45-46.  
49 Albornoz, Arte de los Contractos, Valencia, En casa de Pedro de Huete, 1573, fols. 19v-20v. Cf. 
Coronas Gonzales, El Concepto de Seguro, p. 251. Despite his fame, our knowledge of Albornoz' life 
remains significantly wanting. What we know is that he was born in Galicia, studied at Salamanca, 
published his great opus in 1573, and spent a long time in the ‘New World’. See E.S. Kloss, “El 'arte de 
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obstacle for a proper reconstruction of insurance in terms of fideiussio lay in the 
number of parties involved (debtor, creditor and debtor’s guarantor): insurance was a 
party shorter. This algebraic inconvenience led some careful jurists to describe as 
fideiussio the guarantee of a third party to the insured about the insurer’s solvency 
(the so-called insurance de solvendo), not the insurance itself.50 But Albornoz was not 
a man to be easily discouraged. If the insurer fulfills the role of the guarantor, then the 
insured must be the party receiving the guarantee (and so, the creditor). What was 
missing was the debtor. Albornoz found the missing debtor in the thing-at-risk itself. 
The insured cargo or ship is the debtor, and its obligation lies in arriving safely at 
destination. If the insured thing ‘defaulted’, then the creditor (the insured) would have 
recourse on the guarantor (the insurer).51 
It would be easy to dismiss such a reconstruction as extravagant. In fact, it was 
extremely ingenious. The great advantage of the fideiussio scheme lay in removing 
the insurer from the underlying relationship between main obligor and obligee. This 
way, the insurer-guarantor would look as a third party. The apparently bizarre idea of 
considering the insured thing as the obligor (undertaking to arrive safely at 
destination) was in fact a subtle way of ‘internalising’ the – potentially usurious – 
                                                                                                                                           
los contractos' de Bartolomé de Albornoz, un jurista indiano del siglo XVI”, Revista Chilena de 
Historia del Derecho 11 (1985), 163-185, at 166-169.   
50 Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 1 q. 1, n. 133, p. 36: ‘fideiussor, assecurans mutuantem ad instantiam mutuatarij, 
possit assecurationis pretium exigere a mutuatario’. Cf. Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, 
praefatio, n. 49 and 62, fols. 27r-v and 32v-33r respectively, and, somewhat more vaguely, Santerna, 
note 25, pt. 3, 55-58, fol. 25r-v. Although Civilians used fideiussio typically to describe insurance de 
solvendo, it may even happen to find mention of fideiussio in case of proper reinsurance: Flaminio 
Armenzani (1586-1676) Decisiones Almae Rotae Civilis Ser.Ma Reipublicae Genuensis, Aesii: 
Typographia Episcopali, 1679, dec. 31, n. 1, p. 108. In this case (probably dating to the early 1670s, as 
the policy was of 1668) the reinsurer was considered as fideiussor assecuratoris. 
51 Albornoz, note 49, fol. 19v: insurance ‘es una fianca pura, en la quale el acreedor es el senor de la 
mercaderia, y el obligado es la mercaderia que se obliga de llegar en salvamento y, para esto, die por 
su fiadorel assegurador, el qual la fia que llegarla, y, sino llegarla, que el pagara todo lo que la 
mercaderia vale’. Cf. Juan Azor (Ioannis Azorius, 1535-1603), Institutionum moralium ..., pt. 3, 
Romae, ex typographia Aegidis Spadae,  1611, lib. 11, cap. 18, p. 1020. 
The level of abstraction of the fideiussio scheme’s advocates was such that it 
overlooked a rather obvious objection: the beneficium excussionis. According this 
privilege, the creditor could demand payment to the fideiussor only after having 
sought satisfaction from the main debtor. As the main debtor is the thing insured, it 
does not exist as a legal party. So the beneficium can never take place. Interestingly 
enough, the only author to mention the point was Luis Lopez, but he was more 
concerned with the moral issue of whether it was lawful to sell one’s fides (i.e. the 
guarantee) for money. Lopez, note 45, pt. 2, ch. 16, p. 361. As a matter of fact, the 
objection could have been easily solved, had Lopez looked at legal practice. Civil law 
distinguished between two kinds of fideiussiones: a fideiussio simplex and a fideiussio 
indemnitatis. In the first case, the guarantee was simplex precisely because the 
fideiussor did not enjoy the beneficium excussionis. See e.g. Matteo D'Afflitto (c.1447 -
c.1528) Decisiones Sacri Consilii Neapolitani, à Dn. Matthaeo de Afflictis ... emendatae (Lvdgvni: apud 
haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1552), dec. 318, n. 1-2, pp. 577-588; Gerolamo Magonio (1530-1596), 
Decisiones Causarum tam Rotae Florentinae, quam Rotae Lucensis, Venetijs, apud 
Sessas, 1605, dec. 38, n. 2-14, pp. 104-105, Ottavio Cacherano d’Osasco (d.1589), 
Decisiones Sacri Senatus Pedemontani, Taurini, Strata & Gallus, 1569, dec. 2, n. 14, 
fol. 9v; Flaminio Cartari (Flaminius Chartarius, 1531-1593), Decisiones Causarum 
Executivarum Rotae Reipublicae Genuensis, 2nd edn., Francofurti ad Moenum: 
Feyrabend., 1608, dec. 45, n. 1, p. 128. 
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mechanism of the transfer of risk. The insurer no longer owed the rei aestimatio to the 
insured (as in the case of emptio-venditio). Rather, the rei aestimatio was now owed 
by the res itself. The insurer would simply warrant its payment in case the main 
obligor were to default. Strictly speaking, the passage of risk would occur between the 
owner and his property: the thing-at-risk would warrant for its own safety, and its 
owner would merely seek additional security in case of its default. Ultimately, 
therefore, Albornoz sought to apply the insurance de solvendo mechanism to proper 
insurance contracts.  
Albornoz’s scheme was further elaborated by Francisco García (1525-1585).52 García 
worked on the underlying concept of rei vindicatio: the thing is obliged ‘to arrive 
safely to the power of the creditor’ because he is its owner.53 The easiest explanation 
to first-year law students about rei vindicatio is the image of the magnet: ownership 
attracts the thing owned, regardless of who is in possession. To some extent García 
thought on the same line: the res ‘tends’ to its owner. He simply gave a legal form to 
this ‘tension’ in the insurance context. 
García elaborated Albornoz’s scheme (especially the ‘internalisation’ of the risk 
transfer) with reference to the foenus nauticum, so as to highlight the difference 
between the two contracts and the ensuing non-usurious nature of insurance. As we 
have seen, the position of many jurists was that the risk element (the periculum) 
would ‘neutralise’ the usury accusation.54 This however was based more on subjective 
views about usury than on strict legal reasoning. All creditors faced some risk, for any 
debtor could default. Admittedly, in case of insurance the risk was magnified because 
of the objective danger to which the cargo was exposed. But it was not clear why a 
higher risk would per se ward off usury, especially since the interest rate was 
proportional to the level of risk. The adage incertitudo tollit usuram ultimately relied 
on moral grounds (or common sense), not on legal reasoning. It is probably not 
fortuitous that such an argument was more frequent among moral theologians than 
lawyers.55 Legally speaking, the caveat of Sinibaldo still stood: Gregory IX's decretal 
prohibited interest despite the uncertainty of the gain. As a consequence the foenus 
nauticum had to be considered usurious ‘even if the lender assumed the periculum’.56 
                                                 
52 García, Tratado Utilisímo y Muy General de Todos los Contratos, Pamplona: Ediciones Universitad 
de Navarra, 2003; anastatic reprint of the 1583 edition, ch. 15, p. 473-480. 
53 Ibid., n. 449, p. 474: ‘La mercaduría asegurada es como el deudor, la cual se considera como si 
tuviese obligación de llegar salva a poder del acreedor, que es el dueño de ella, de la manera que el 
deudor tiene obligación de pagar al acreedor su deuda’ (emphasis added).   
54 See also infra, notes 82-83. 
55  A good example is Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva (1512-1577), Variarum ex Iure Pontificio, Regio 
et Caesareo Resolutionum Libri III, Salamanticae, excudebat Andreas a Portonarijs, 1552, lib. 3, ch. 2, 
n. 5, fol. 174v: ‘quod ultra sortem accipitur, non datur ratione mutui: nec propter usum pecuniae, nec 
propter nudum interesse interusurij (sic) temporis: sed propter aliam iustissimam causam: nempe 
periculi contra naturam mutui spectantis ad creditorem’. Equitable as it might be, this reasoning could 
hardly lift the prohibition of the decretal Naviganti. Hence, Covarrubias highlighted the labour of the 
insurer-lender, the reasonable amount of interest, and any other possible feature which would make the 
interest look more as remuneration for actual work than a simple premium (ibid., fols. 175r-176r). 
From a legal viewpoint, however, the problem was not solved. Cp. the second (and much revised) 
edition of the treatise of Luis de Alcalá (c.1490-1549), Tractado de los prestamos que passan entre 
mercaderes y tractantes, Toledo, en casa de Juan de Ayala, 1546, pt. 2, fol. 29v (the first edition is of 
1543).  
56 François Marc (Franciscus Marcius, XVI century), Decisiones Aureae in Sacro Delphinatus Senatu 
Discussae ac Promulgatae, Venetiis, 1559, quaestio 891, n. 1, fol. 324v: ‘naviganti vel eunti ad 
nundinas mutuans pecunias etiam si suscipiens in se periculum prohibetur aliquid recipere vltra 
sortem’.  
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Albornoz's and García's insurance-fideiussio scheme sought to avert the application of 
Naviganti on strictly legal basis. Instead of arguing for the non-usurious nature of the 
undertaking (and so, avoiding the decretal ex post, through moral arguments), it pre-
empted the decretal’s applicability ex ante, focusing on the formal position of the 
insurer as simple guarantor.  
Having described the thing-at-risk as the main debtor, García added that all this was 
obviously a fiction. Effectively, with regard to the insured, the position of the res and 
that of the insurer are one and the same. So, he concluded, the obligation of the thing 
to its owner is actually that of the insurer towards the insured: the thing simply 
represents the value of the obligation.57 García insisted on the fictitious nature of the 
entire scheme not to give his game away, but to pave the way for his true innovation 
to Albornoz's scheme. Albornoz used the fideiussio scheme to avoid the decretal 
Naviganti with an abstract theorisation; García moved between legal fiction and 
reality so as to exploit their combined effect against the application of Naviganti to 
insurance.  
While the fideiussio scheme personified the thing-at-risk, considering it the main 
debtor, in practice the position of the insurer and that of the thing-at-risk (the main 
debtor) were one and the same. The obligation of the thing-at-risk was therefore owed 
to the insured as owner of the thing. In the foenus nauticum, the insurer has a 
conditional credit against the insured: the latter would pay back the amount he 
borrowed if the thing arrived safely. As the foenus is a particular kind of mutuum, 
when the contract is made there is only one outstanding obligation – that of the 
borrower towards the lender. But describing the operation in terms of fideiussio meant 
keeping alive also the obligation of the lender to the borrower (or, in theory, of the 
thing-at-risk towards its owner). The insurer-guarantor would therefore still owe a 
debt to the insured (the rei aestimatio), which is precisely the same as his credit as 
lender. This would make the insurer at the same time debtor and creditor of the 
obligation, which would lead to the ipso iure setting-off of the two positions (or 
rather, to their mutual extinction by confusio).58  
At first sight, García’s reasoning would appear clearly wanting. The entire scheme of 
fideiussio may be used so long as the insurer is not effectively lending money to the 
                                                 
57 García, note 52, ch. 15, n. 459, p. 477. 
58 Ibid., n. 459-461, p. 477-478: ‘Arriba se declaró comó, en este contrato, y en el de las fianzas, 
concurrían tres personas, el acreedor, el deudor, y el asegurador o el fiador. Dijimos más, que aunque 
formalmente entrevengan estas tres personas, con todo eso, no hay más de dos contrayentes, a causa 
de que el fiador o el asegurador, juntamente con el deudor, hacen oficio de un solo contrayente. De 
manera que el asegurador y el fiador siempre se tienen de parte del deudor, cuya obligación toman a 
su cuenta, y con quien hacen una misma persona. Luego si esto es así, no puede el que empresta salir 
fiador o asegurador de su mismo dinero, porque entonces el asegurador se tendría de parte del 
acreedor, y esto repugna a la naturaleza de este contrato. Quién jamás vio, que el mismo acreedor 
salga fianza, o pueda salir fianza por su misma deuda que otro le debe? Pues tampoco puede asegurar 
sus mismos dineros emprestados que el otro le debe. Ultra de esto imposible es convenir en un mismo 
subjeto, y en respecto de una misma cosa, dar y recibir seguridad sobre un mismo negocio, porque el 
dar seguridad es acción, y el recibirla es pasión, y no se pueden hallar en un mismo subjeto, y en 
respecto de una misma cosa, acción y pasión, de suerte que el mismo que es agente de una cosa, ése 
sea el paciente de ella. Luego de que empresta no puede asegurar su misma moneda, haciendo oficio 
de acreedor y asegurador, porque (en cuanto es acreedor) recibe seguridad de su deuda, y en cuanto 
asegurador, promete y da la misma seguridad de aquélla. Más adelante, el que asegura o da 
seguridad, toma en sí los peligros temidos, el que recibe la seguridad, y a quien se hace el 
aseguramiento, queda libre de los dichos peligros; pero no es cosa posible que uno mismo reciba en sí 
y a su cuenta los peligros de una cosa, encargándose de ellos, y que juntamente quede libre de ellos. 
Luego no puede ser que uno mismo sea, en un mismo negocio, acreedor y asegurador, y por 
consiguiente, que el mismo que empresta, ése asegure sus dineros emprestados. 
 17 
insured under a foenus nauticum. But that was precisely the point: shaped as 
fideiussio, insurance was incompatible with foenus nauticum – and so with any rule 
provided expressly for it.59 Insurance was not the same as maritime loan, but the 
ultimate effect of the decretal Naviganti was to neutralise the defence of the lender’s 
risk. As such, it could be applied by analogy to the risk of the insurer, in which case 
the susceptio periculi might not suffice to prove insurance as legitimate. García’s 
ingenuity lay precisely in this: the usury accusation stemmed from the foenus 
nauticum, which the fideiussio scheme made inapplicable even by analogy to 
insurance. As García had it, 'the position of creditor is incompatible with that of 
insurer'.60 
 
 
2.4. Insurance as sponsio 
 
Another possibility – the simplest – was to consider insurance as wager, shaped as a 
promise (sponsio, or stipulatio conditionalis).61 Jurists often mentioned sponsio when 
writing about insurance,62 but mainly for the sake of completeness – as yet another 
way to classify insurance. No lawyer dealing thoroughly with insurance considered 
wager a satisfactory option. This chiefly because sponsio is a supremely abstract 
agreement. Such abstraction led to a combination of great practical malleability and 
extreme legal inflexibility. Practical ductility, because it is possible to wager on 
anything. Whatever the content of the wager, legally speaking it would be not its 
object but its condition.63 So, in the insurance context, the safe arrival of the cargo at 
destination would not be the object of the contract but rather the condition of the 
wager. This means that the actual object of the wager is somewhat peripheral to its 
structure, it is simply a condition attached to it. Wager has neither socio-economic 
function nor legal causa beyond itself. In the words of Scaccia, ‘insurance has a clear 
causa, which is just and useful: the insured seeks to avoid the damage. Sponsio has an 
indirect causa, whose utility is not immediate’.64 Legally speaking, the causa of the 
sponsio is the sponsio itself. Several authors argued that the sponsio’s condition 
                                                 
59 Cf. Salón, note 47, § Disputatio de Contractu Assecurationis, art. 4, n. 6, p. 687. 
60 García, note 52, ch. 15, n. 462, p. 478: 'el oficio del asegurador repugna al oficio del acreedor'. 
61 In theory, it was possible to consider wager either a simple sponsio or a more formal stipulatio 
conditionalis. Yet in practice there was no difference, for in mercantile courts sponsio (as much as any 
other nudum pactum) was enforceable even if lacking of the formal vest of stipulatio: Stracca, De 
sponsionibus, in Id., De Mercatura, seu mercatore, omnia quae ad hoc genus pertinent, Ludguni, Apud 
Sebastianum Barptolomaei (sic) Honorati, 1556, pt. 2, n. 4, p. 179-183, esp. 182-183. 
62 E.g. Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 24, fol. 19v; Stracca, De Sponsionibus, note 61, pt. 11, n. 1, p. 194, 
and pt. 12, n. 1, p. 195; Lopez, note 45, pt. 2, ch. 16, p. 352-3; Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1, n. 97, p. 25-
27; Leys, note 40, lib. 2, cap. 22, dub. 11, n. 66, p. 281; Domingo de Bañes (1528-1604), Decisones de 
Iure et Iustitia, vol. 4, Duaci, ex typographia Petri Borremans, 1615, q. 78, art. 4, p. 323-325; Hevia 
Bolaño, note 42, pt. 3, ch. 15, n. 12, p. 663; Ansaldi, note 47, disc. 70, n. 10, p. 428; Johan van der 
Sande (Johannis a Sande, 1568-1638), Decisiones Frisicae, Sive Rerum in Suprema Frisiorum Curia 
Judicatarum Libri Quinque, Amstelodami, Thomam Myls, 1698, lib. 3, tit. 9, def. 1, p. 145-146. 
63 Or, as elegantly put by Jean Wamèse (Johannes Wamesius, 1524-1590), ‘purificatio conditionis’. 
Wamèse, Responsa seu Consilia ad Ius, Forumque Civile Pertinentia, vol. 2, Antverpiae, apud 
Henricum Aretissens, 1651, centuria 4, cons. 24, n. 4, p. 65. 
64 Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1, n. 131, p. 36: 'contractus assecurationis in substantia, et iustitia pretij 
non differt a contractu sponsionis, differunt autem solum in hac qualitate, quod assecuratio habet 
evidentem causam, iustam, et utilem, quia assecuratus intendit evitare damnum, at sponsio habet 
latentem causam, cuius utilitas non apparet, et hac ratione commercium assecurationis est Reipublicae 
utilius, et iustius.’ Clearly enough, the term ‘causa’ is voluntarily ambiguous, for it refers both to the 
economic function of the agreement as well as the legal causa negotii.  
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should be treated as its causa. 65 Stracca in particular sought to colour the causa of the 
wager in terms of transfer of an actual risk, so to distinguish insurance-sponsio from 
other ‘pure’ forms of wager.66  
Such attempts, however, could not fully avoid the limits of sponsio, first of all its 
abstraction. For the focus of the agreement would necessarily shift from the safety of 
the thing-at-risk (and so on the impact the mishap would have on the ship or cargo 
insured) to the abstract occurrence of the condition. A good example comes from a 
hull policy shaped as a wager. The ship was spoiled by pirates and left as a wreckage, 
but a wreckage that arrived at destination. The object of the insurance-wager was 
whether the ship would arrive at destination. Technically she did, for ‘even if torn to 
pieces it was then repaired keeping the same hull, leaving no doubt that it was the 
same ship’. 67  On this basis, the insurers refused to pay. Strictly speaking, the 
condition had not occurred: in its essence, the ship arrived at destination. The court 
was able to condemn the insurers only by moving away from the wager structure and 
stressing the susceptio periculi element.68 
In the above case the insurers were probably specious in their arguments, which might 
resemble the paradox of the ship of Argo, but they had a point in law. Yet the limits 
of sponsio may be more easily appreciated in case of blatant fraud. Absence of risk 
                                                 
65 Ibid., § 1, q. 1, n. 89, p. 24: ‘in stipulationis conditionalis solus eventus conditionis habetur pro 
causa’. See also Santerna, note 25, pt. 2, n. 2-3, fol. 8v; Stracca, De sponsionibus, note 61, pt. 2, n. 4, p. 
180: Conditio ipsa in sponsione adjecta pro causa habeatur, et de alia causa curandum non sit: 
succedit enim, cum existerit loco causae [...] In illis verbis, est enim iusta conventio, si quaelibet causa 
in conditione iurisiurandi deducta fuerit [...] Et notandum est praedicta vera esse, etiam si conditio 
proprie dici non possit: ut in illa quae praesens, vel praeteritum tempus respicit: licet enim proprie 
non sit conditio, pro causa tamen habetur'. 
66 Stracca, De sponsionibus, note 61, pt. 11, n. 1, p. 194: ‘Si enim merces vel naufragio, impetu 
ventorum, vel tempestate, seu alio casu perierint, ex quo tuo periculo merces suscepisti, non 
interveniente stipulatione adversus te, qui promitisti, actione oneris adversi recte ago. [...] Quam 
conventionem non improbandam ego etiam puto, propter periculum, quod promittentes (vulgo 
Assecuratores nuncupati) suscipiunt.' Cf. Denis Godefroy (Dionysius Gothofredus, 1549-1622), 
Corpus Iuris Civilis in IIII Partes Distinctum …, Ludguni, in officina Barthol. Vincentij, 1583, ad 
D.22.2.5 pr., § in aliam speciem (lit. a), col. 693. The point was not fully appreciated by other jurists, 
who reduced insurance to ‘pure’ wager and thus lost the peculiarities of the instrument. For instance, in 
looking at insurance as a simple wager, Bañes seemed to forget that the premium did not correspond to 
the win of the insurer (in case of safe arrival of the ship), but it would be paid to him also in case of 
mishap. Bañes, note 62, q. 78, art. 4, p. 324, ‘Contractum qui dicitur depositionis, sive daciationis 
(sic), quod vulgo dicitur, apuesta [wager], est enim perinde talis assecuratio, atque si assecurator 
deponeret 100 amittenda, si navis perierit, contra quatuor lucranda si non perierit.’ 
67 ‘Etiam si dillacerata [navis] esset cum tamen postea refecta fuerit, eadem carina manente, non est 
dubium eandem navem esse’, Gabriel Pereira de Castro (1571-1632), Decisiones Supremi 
Eminentissimique Senatus Portugalliae, Vlyssipone, apud Petrum Craesbeeck, 1621, dec. 56, n. 9, p. 
285. Cf. Stracca, De Navibus, in Id., De Mercatura, seu mercatore, note 61, pt. 2, n. 9, 249. See also 
Id., De Sponsionibus, note 61, pt. 13, n. 1-6, p. 195-196. 
It might be noted that some jurists reasoned on a similar line, mutatis mutandis, so as to exclude the 
insurers’ liability for cargo insurance when the mishap occurred on a lighter. When the place of arrival 
did not face on the sea but on a river, the cargo had to be brought to the ship or ashore through small 
lighters. And yet the lighter was not considered as an integral feature of the ship. So, in case of mishap 
occurring on the lighter, the insurer did not have to pay – unless he had expressly extended his 
obligation also to the lighters. Hevia Bolaño, note 42, lib. 3, ch. 14, n. 23, p. 657, Santerna, note 25, pt. 
3, n. 36-39 fols. 21v-22r, and Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 8, n. 7, fols. 61v-62r and esp. 
gl. 13, n. 3, fols. 97v-98r. 
68 Pereira, note 67, dec. 56, n. 10, p. 286: ‘assecuratores, qui periculum subeunt in corpore navis, 
quod illa vivente non tenetur, unde si a pyratis (sic) capiatur, et destruantur armamenta, rostra vel 
clavus, malaque proscindatur, utique si tunc evader, debet aestimari navis, in eo statu in quo relicta 
fuit, ut illud praetium deteriorationis solvat, residuum vero a Magistro [navis] petatur.’ 
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did not invalidate the undertaking: ‘though the chance of mishap terminates, the causa 
of the promise of the price does not’.69 False representation of the value of the thing-
at-risk was equally irrelevant, ‘because in contracts of strict law a false causa does not 
avoid the undertaking’.70 Once established that the wager was lawful, the court would 
simply enforce it.71 Equitable considerations could play no role in it,72 and little room 
was left for a thorough analysis of the will of the parties.73 
By contrast, emptio-venditio and locatio-conductio were both contracts grounded on 
good faith. 74  Among the two, emptio-venditio was perhaps more open to legal 
controls, because of the correspondence required between res and price. Linking 
insurance to wager was obivious, but also dangerous: sponsio could not be fully 
controlled. It is no coincidence that the first treatise on insurance, that of Santerna, 
was entitled 'de Assecurationibus et Sponsionibus'. The ambiguity between 
assecuratio and sponsio in the title perfectly matches its content: reading Santerna’s 
treatise, it is often difficult to neatly distinguish the two contracts. Yet, when defining 
insurance in legal terms, Santerna opted for emptio-venditio. Almost a century later, 
Stracca had no qualms about explaining insurance in terms of sponsio when writing 
his treatise de Sponsionibus.75 In that context, insurance was simply used by way of 
example. But when he devoted a treatise specifically to insurance, Stracca opted for 
the emptio-venditio scheme. The same is true for several other jurists.76 
A last consideration on the suitability of wager is more ethical. Sponsio did not dispel 
the doubts as to the morality of the agreement. On the contrary, especially if applied 
to life insurance, it was positively repugnant.77 
 
Not all jurists who dealt with insurance felt the need to investigate its precise legal 
form. If the purpose was simply to justify the premium, it could be sufficient to 
                                                 
69 ‘Licet cesset periculum, nondum cessat causa promissionis et stipulationis ipsius pretii’, Santerna, 
note 25, pt. 3, n. 21, fol. 19r. Many jurists used the same principle to defend the validity of the cargo 
insurance when both parties were aware that nothing had been laden onboard. In such a case, they 
argued, the agreement no longer focused on the assumption of the risk, but rather it was a simple 
wager. See e.g. Lopez, note 45, pt. 2, ch. 16, p. 360; Bañes, note 62, q. 78, art. 4, p. 324; Hevia Bolaño, 
note 42, lib. 3, ch. 14, n. 17, p. 655; Leys, note 40, lib. 2, cap. 24, dub. 4, n. 28, p. 324-325 
70 ‘Quia in contractibus strictis iuris, falsa causa non vitiat obligationem’. Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 
11, fol. 16v. 
71 More in general, it might be interesting to note how the Civilians’ dislike of sponsio was only 
matched by the enthusiasm for penal bonds among litigants, especially at Common law, as the most 
successful way to ward off interference from the bench. 
72 For instance, if the insured agreed to pay the premium but did not load the cargo onboard and 
notified the insurer, the latter could still claim the premium in full: ibid. See also the problems arising 
from the difference in quantity between the insured cargo and the cargo actually laden onboard, or for 
the case the cargo insured was already damaged or wasted when laden onboard. In such cases, the 
jurists resorted to equity to reduce the premium: ibid, pt. 4, n. 56-59, fols. 44v-45r. 
73 Ibid., pt. 3, n. 49, fol. 24r. 
74  Cf. Luis de Molina (1535-1600), Disputationes de Contractibus ..., Venetiis, Apud Matthiam 
Collosinum, et Baretium Baretium (sic), 1601, pt. 2, disp. 507, n. 6, 677-678. 
75 Stracca, de Sponsionibus, note 61, pt. 11, n. 1, 193-194. 
76 For instance, Molina placed wager immediately after insurance, and Scaccia did the opposite. But 
both defined insurance as emptio-venditio. Molina, note 74, disp. 507 ('De contractu assecuriationis', p. 
675-680) and disp. 508 ('De Contractu sponsionis', p. 680); Scaccia, note 36, § 1 q. 1, n. 84-127, p. 21-
34 ('De Sponsione, et Ludo'), and n. 128-170, p. 34-46 ('De Assecuratione'). Cf. Ceccarelli, note 2, 627. 
77 See for all Mazzolini, note 42, sub Negotium, q. 4, fol. 344v. One of the few authors who defended 
life insurance in terms of sponsio was Scaccia. But he did so mainly to put as much distance as possible 
between insurance and loan. Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 1 q. 1, n. 97, p. 25-27, esp. p. 27. The dubious morality 
of life insurance as wager was by contrast a strong point for the advocates of the fideiussio scheme: see 
e.g. Lopez, note 45, pt. 2, ch. 16, 357-358. 
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highlight the useful economic function of insurance for commerce,78 or just to stress 
the aleatory nature of the insurer’s undertaking.79 Often, the same jurist provided 
several alternative schemes for insurance.80 The only limit was loan: whatever the 
legal relationship between insurer and insured, insurance could be defended so long as 
it was not qualified as mutuum.81 The insurer’s risk was against the very nature of 
loan (contra naturam mutui), and so ‘the uncertainty eliminates the vice, or 
presumption, of usury’82 As the periculum made the insurer’s gain uncertain, and so it 
removed suspicion of usury, Civilians insisted on the susceptio periculi to defend the 
legitimacy of insurance.83  
 
 
3. Laying insurance on Procrustes’ bed 
 
Wager aside, whatever the contractual scheme adopted (and so the underlying legal 
reasoning), some practical consequences were the same. Without merchandise laden 
onboard, the undertaking was void. No periculum was actually sold, agreed upon in a 
locatio-conductio, or undertaken as an obligation to do in an innominate contract. In 
case of fideiussio this was all the more apparent, for lack of merchandise meant 
absence of debtor.84 The same applied to the case where the mishap was imputable to 
the insured (either as culpa or, even more, as dolus). Whatever the contractual scheme 
                                                 
78  E.g. E.g. Johan Marquard (1610-1668), Tractatus Politico-Juridicus de Iure Mercantorum et 
Commerciorum Singulari …, Francofurti, Ex Officina Thomae Matthiae Götzii, 1662, lib. 2, ch. 13, n. 
4 and 9, p. 330 and 332 respectively. See further Ceccarelli, note 2, 629-630; Cassandro, “Note 
Storiche sul Contratto di Assicurazione”, Assicurazioni 26 (1959), 16-57, at 17-19. 
79  E.g. Peter Binsfeld (Petrus Binsfeldius, 1545-1598), Commentarius theologicus et juridicus in 
titulum juris canonici de usuriis, 1593, ch. 19, q. 2, p. 527-528. 
80 So, for instance, for Salón, note 47, § Disputatio de Contractu Assecurationis, art. 1, n. 3, p. 677, 
insurance could be a locatio-conductio (specifically, ‘contractus commissionis’), but also a fideiussio 
(ibid.), and possibly also a case of emptio-venditio (ibid., n. 5).  
81 Cf. Lupo, note 42, Commentarius tertius, § 1, n. 15-16, fol. 96r; Agostino Beró (Augustinus 
Beroius, 1474-1554), Consiliorum sive responsorum Avgvstini Beroii Bononien. …, vol. 1, Venetiis, 
apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1577, cons. 168, n. 1, p. 625. 
82 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, praefatio, n. 35, fol. 22r-v: ’Diversa ergo est ratio inter 
emptionem et venditionem et mutuum. In emptione enim incertitudo tollit vitium seu praesumptionem 
usurae: Contra vero in mutuo, in quo vitium usurarum non purgatur, licet periculum ad creditorem 
pertineat [...] diversitatis rationem esse, quis contractus mutui magis proximus est usurae, quam alii 
contractus. Nam in contractu mutui usura vere et proprie quo ad formam et re ipsa contrahitur: sed in 
aliis velut in contractu emptionis licet re ipsa et improprie usura contrahi dici possit; tamen quo ad sui 
formam et proprie non contrahitur'. Cf. esp. Santerna, note, 25, pt. 1, n. 5-12, fols. 4r-5v. 
83 Virtually all jurists stessed the point. Perhaps the clearest explanation from a legal standpoint is that 
of Lupo, note 42, Commentarius tertius, § 1, n. 14-15, fol. 95r-v. See also the sharp remarks of Molina, 
note 74, pt. 2, disp. 507, n. 2, p. 675-676. Cf., inter alios, Perez, note 34, ad C.4.33, n. 3 and 6, p. 191-
192; Mattheus van Wesenbeek (Matthaeus Wesenbeck, 1531-1586), Matthaei Wesenbecii Paratitla in 
Pandectas Iuris Civilis …, Basileae, 1566, ad D.22.2, n. 3, p. 273; Beró, note 81, cons. 168, n. 7, p. 
626; Guilielmus Cornhuysius (d. 1617?) Digestorum seu Pandectarum Iuris Ciuilis Partitio et 
Methodus Antverpiae, ex officina Christophe Plantin, 1565, p. 66-67; Hendrik Zoes (Henricus Zoesius, 
1571–1627), Henr. Zoesii … Commentarius ad Digestorum seu Pandectarum Juris Civilis Libros L …, 
Lovanii, Typis ac Sumptibus Hieronymi Nempaei, 1667, ad D.22.2, n. 3-4, p. 466-467; William 
Welwod (1578–1622), An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes, London, Lownes, 1613, tit. 14, p. 37; 
Covarrubias, note 55, fols. 174v-175r.  
Incidentally, in the same period the susceptio periculi was employed also to shield the foenus nauticum 
from usury accusations. See e.g. Paul van Christynen (Paulus Christineus, 1543-1631), Practicarum 
Quaestionum Rerumque in Supremis Belgarum Curiis Iudicatarum Observatarumque, vol. 3, 
Antverpiae, apud Hieronimum et Ioannem Bapt. Verdvssen, 1660, tit. 33, dec. 47, n. 4, p. 548. 
84 García, note 52, cap. 15, n. 455, p. 475-476. 
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chosen for insurance, the imputability of the mishap to the insured would exonerate 
the counterparty.85 This was the case even for wager: ‘broad as it may be, the sponsio 
formula could not be shaped so that the promissor insured against the fraud or fault of 
the promisee’.86 More precisely, in a sponsio the condition that fails to materialise 
(e.g. the safe arrival of the thing-at-risk) because of the fact of the promisee is to be 
considered as having occurred.87 
Beyond these and similar scenarios the choice of a contractual scheme did have 
important consequences. A few times, they were advantageous. It is the case, for 
instance, of emptio-venditio of the thing-at-risk (as opposed to the risk in it) and 
fideiussio. Considering the insurer as the owner of the thing-at-risk until its safe 
arrival at destination, as Bosco did, had a practical advantage: it allowed the insurer to 
vindicate the ownership of any part of the insured cargo that had not perished in the 
shipwreck.88 This way, the insurer was entitled to claim whatever was left of the 
cargo (or ship) insured after having paid for its whole value to the insured. Such was 
the practice among merchants: upon recovery, the insured would transfer his rights on 
the insured thing to the insurer, so to allow him to recover (and sell) it, thereby 
reducing his loss. If the insurer was already the owner of the thing, then he could 
proceed with the recovery at once, without having to wait for the insured’s waiver. 
Fideiussio reached the same purpose, because of the right of recourse of the guarantor 
on the main debtor (the insured thing). This way, the insurer-guarantor could claim 
                                                 
85 See Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 46-48, fols. 23v-24r, and esp. pt. 4, n. 15-17, fols. 35v-36r, and n. 29, 
fol. 39r; Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 20, n. 4, fols. 114v-115r; Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 1, q. 1, 
n. 154, p. 42; Perez, note 34, ad C. 4.33, n. 4, p. 191; Denis Godefroy, Codicis Dn. Ivstiniani … Libri 
XII …, Lugduni, in officina Barthol. Vincentij, 1583, ad C.4.33.4, § amissarum (lit. q), col. 312; 
Molina, note 74, pt. 2, disp. 507, n. 2, 676; Welwod, note 83,  tit. 14, p. 37; Christynen, note 83, tit. 33, 
dec. 47, n. 5, p. 548. See also Agostinho Barbosa (1590-1649), Collectanea in Codicem Iustiniani ..., 
Ludguni, sumptibus Anisson, et Possuel, 1720, vol. 2, ad C.4.33.4, § Cum proponas, n. 1-8, fol. 153r-v, 
with a particularly large (and accurate) number of references to Civil lawyers. 
86 ‘Quamvis enim latissime concept sit formula sponsionis […] ita tamen concepta non est, imo 
concipi non potuit, ut dolum ac culpam stipulantis assecurationem sponsor praestare debeat’, 
Wamèse, note 63, centuria 4, cons. 25, proem. and n. 1, p. 67. Wamèse was particularly clear on the 
point, perhaps because he was counsel for the insurer. The other counsel was another law professor and 
colleague of Wamèse at Leuven, Elbert de Leeuw (Elbertus Leoninus, 1520-1598). Leeuw was more 
detailed on the point: ‘Quamvis enim latissime concepta sit formula sponsionis: ita ut vix ullus sit casus 
eventuri periculi, qui ea non comprehendatur, sive is sit plane fortuitus, sive ex tertij alicujus facto, 
etiam improbabili, provenientis, et qui alioqui in simplici assicuratione, seu sponsione non facile 
contineretur; ita tamen concepta non est, imo concipi non potuit […] ut dolum ac culpam stipulantis 
assecurationem sponsor praestare debeat: ideoque in generali, effusaque periculi quomodocunque 
contingentis promissione, non continetur illud periculum, ac damnum, quod facto aut culpa stipulantis 
contingit, sed illud exceptum semper intelligitur, quasi illiberale et contra bonos mores sit, facti proprij 
poenam in alterius detrimentum, et damnum convertere, et ex hujusmodi stipulatione dolum et culpam 
affectandi occasionem praebere’. Leeuw, Centuria consiliorum clarissimi jurisconsulti Elberti Leonini 
…, Arnhemii, ex officina Joannis Jacobi, 1656, cons. 23, proem. and n. 1, 255-256. 
87 E.g. Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 25 and 26-29, fols. 19v-20v. Cf. Barbosa, note 85, ad C.4.33.4, § 
Cum proponas, p. 152. 
88  Bosco, cons. 391, n. 2, p. 612: ‘Item per viam verae venditionis mercium resolvendae sub 
conditione assecurationem contrahunt, quod probatur ex communi observantia tali, quia si contingat 
res illas, super quibus est facta securitas, capi, dictae res tanquam effectae assecuratorum pro parte, 
qua assecuraverunt super ipsis, per eos vendicantur, et recuperantur, et de ipsis, tanquam de propriis 
disponunt, quasi tanquam res venditae ex die contractae assecurationis tot viagio fuerint ipsorum 
emptorum, et assecuratorum periculo’. The point has been widely studied: see E. Bensa, Il contratto di 
assicurazione nel Medio Evo: studi e ricerche, Genoa, Tipografia Marittima Editrice, 1884, p. 134; G. 
Bonolis, Svolgimento storico dell’assicurazione in Italia, Florence, Galileiana, 1901, p. 32; F. Edler-de 
Roover, “Early Examples of Marine Insurance”, 5 Journal of Economic History (1945), p. 186. 
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whatever was left of the cargo or ship insured after having paid for its whole value to 
the insured.89  
In many important cases, however, no contractual scheme would entirely suit 
insurance. Or rather, in order to do so, Civilians had to be considerably flexible with 
the contractual scheme of their choice.  
A good example is the issue of the insurable value, especially with regard to the value 
at destination. The emptio-venditio scheme focused on the rei aestimatio. In Leys’ 
definition of insurance, the insurer ‘undertakes to pay the value of the thing in case it 
perished’ (‘se obligat ad solvendum rei aestimationem, in eventum quo perierit’).90 
This however presupposed that the object of the contract was the value of the thing-
at-risk at the moment of the sale. A first consequence was that the thing had to be in 
existence at the moment of the contract. Stracca was particularly clear on the point. If 
the insurance is a contract of sale, and its object is the value of the thing-at-risk, then 
the thing must exist when the contract is made. Otherwise, the sale would be an 
emptio spei.91 Moving from Bosco’s sale of the thing-at-risk to Santerna’s sale of the 
risk in the thing offered many advantages, but it could not be pushed too far. The 
periculum susceptum by the insurer was limited in time: within a certain period it 
would either materialise or disappear. But it was necessary that the risk existed at the 
moment of the contract. To this end, it was essential that the thing also existed.92 The 
jurists who analysed insurance in terms of emptio-venditio were keen on the point, for 
this distinguished insurance from wagers at large. If the rei aestimatio was ‘sold’ 
when the policy was made, then it ought to refer to the value of the res at the moment 
of departure, not of arrival of the ship.93 In other words, the emptio-venditio model 
conditioned the insurable value, ‘because the valuation takes the place of the thing’.94 
As the policy could not exceed the cost price, it was not possible to insure the value at 
                                                 
89 García, note 52, ch. 15, n. 453, p. 475: ‘De aquí nace que cuando la cosa asegurada se pierde, todo 
lo que de ella queda salvo se entrega al asegurador, para que de allí rehaga su daños, o en todo, o en 
parte, según que fuere possible.’ 
90 Supra, note 40. 
91 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, praefatio, n. 13, fol. 13v: ‘quia emitur alea, hoc est spes rei, 
non dicitur periculi pretium, sed rei non existentis, et rei quae in spe est emptio’. See further ibid., n. 
46, fol. 26v. As we will see, when applied to insurance, the emptio-venditio scheme could not be fully 
separated from emptio spei. This is probably why a jurist as careful as Molina, note 74, pt. 2, disp. 507, 
n. 2, 675, was clear to shape the emptio-venditio of the periculum to the emptio spei model.   
92 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, praefatio, n. 13, fol. 13v: ‘Licet nec emptio nec venditio sine 
re quae veneat, possit intelligi, aliquando tamen sine re venditio intelligitur, veluti cum quasi alea 
emitur, quod sit cum captus piscium et avium, quia spei emptio est’. 
93 Ibid., gl. 6, n. 1, fol. 51r: 'Quoniam licet conditionalis sit contractus, considerato adversae fortunae 
casu, non tamen assecurator dicitur debitor rei sub conditione vel modo […] sed semper dicitur 
debitor aestimationis ad quam se obligavit, quae aestimatio certa est'. 
94 Santerna, note 25, pt. 4, n. 57, fol. 45r: ‘sicut ille qui habet extimationem rei dicitur ficte habere rem 
[…] ita possumus dicere, quod promittens extimationem ficte, censetur promittere rem, et in eo possit 
habere locum dispositio [...] quia aestimatio succedit loco rei’. See also ibid., pt. 3, n. 42, fol. 23r: 'licet 
iste contractus [assecurationis] ut pluries dixit sit conditionalis habito respectu ad adventum periculi, 
tamen non potest dici debitor rei, sub conditione vel modo […] sed semper dicitur debitor illius 
extimationis quam promittit quando se obligat, quae extimatio erat certa quando promittitur quanti res 
est […] quod hic debetur extimatio iure obligationis, eo quod principaliter ad eam se obligat, et sic 
inspicitur tempus contractae obligationis'. Cf. Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6, n. 3, fol. 
52r: 'verum dici posset spectari tempus emptionis in casu nostro, non illud quo merces emptae sunt, à 
dominis, sed quo assecurationis contractus celebratus est, contractus namque iste (ut non semel dixi) 
similis est emptioni, et merito inspiciatur tempus quo pretio periculum emitur, vel diem tempus 
contractae obligationis super assecuratione spectandum, [...] ut damnum emendetur ratione contraxtus 
super assecuratione, quasi contrahentes ad tempus contractae obligationis se retulerint'. 
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destination.95 Of course the parties could inflate the value of the thing-at-risk. But this 
ill-suited the scheme of emptio-venditio, for it relied on the fact that only an 
exorbitant disproportion between value agreed upon and actual value would trigger 
the laesio aenormis mechanism.96  Insuring the value at destination was not fully 
compatible with the emptio-venditio scheme97 – it might have suited more the locatio-
                                                 
95 Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 40-46, fols. 22v-23v; Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6, n. 1-3, 
fols. 50v-52v; Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1, n. 169, p. 44-45. 
96 Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 45-46, fol. 23r-v, and pt. 5, n. 1, fol. 48r; Stracca, De Assecurationibus, 
note 39, gl. 6 n. 4, fol. 53r; Ripoll, note 47, ch. 21, n. 131, p. 232; Beró, note 81, cons. 168 n. 5, p. 626; 
Scaccia, note 36, § 1 q. 7, pt. 2, ampl. 10, n. 14, p. 331 (for a lengthy review of juristic debates on the 
point see ibid., n. 5-7, p. 322-329). A dissenting voice on the point was that of Rocco. According to 
him, the laesio aenormis remedy could not be invoked in insurance matters, because the insurer knew 
from the beginning that his premium would amount to far less than the value of the insured thing. 
Accordingly, 'the said remedy does not apply where both parties were aware of that' ('dictum remedium 
non habet locum inter scientes'), Rocco, note 41, not. 7, n 15, p. 394. Strictly speaking, Rocco had a 
point in law. If insurance fell within the sale scheme, then the premium was the pretium paid for the rei 
aestimatio. In practice, the premium was discounted after the expected probability of mishap. So it 
would typically amount to just a little part of the value of the insured thing. But this discounting 
operation was alien to the laesio aenormis principle. As such, the disproportion between pretium and 
rei aestimatio ought to trigger the laesio mechanism. Rocco avoided this unfortunate conclusion by 
invoking the 'inter scientes' principle. But his argument is rather telling about the limits of the emptio-
venditio scheme. 
97 Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 41, fol. 22v, argued that the insurance value (the rei aestimatio) was to be 
reckoned according to whether the warranty focused on the value of the thing or on its safe arrival at 
destination: 'aut qui promittit salutem mercium in certo loco, ut puta Vlisbonae, et tunc eius loci 
existimatio inspicienda est […] aut non promisit dare merces salvas in certo loco: sed tantum 
extimationem, vel valorem merciorum in casu periculi scilicet si navis periret, ut fieri solet etiam 
inspici debet tempus obligationis, et sic prout tunc valebant, debet fieri extimatio'. The cost price 
reckoning had sound basis: 'quia tunc extimatio debetur iure obligationis, et sic videtur permitti id 
quod tunc valebant […] Item qui procurat in adventu periculi extimationem rerum suarum videtur 
magis providere damnum ne patiatur in ammissione (sic) rerurm non autem considerat lucrum, et per 
consequens venit illud in quo tunc damnum sentire potest quando stipulatur, et non venit lucrum' 
(ibid.). But Santerna found a legal ground for the value at destination as well. Since the object of the 
insurer's obligation was the rei aestimatio, nothing prevented the parties from agreeing to a different 
aestimatio than the price cost: 'licet iste contractus ut pluries dixit sit conditionalis, habito respectu ad 
adventum periculi, tamen [assecurator] non potest dici debitor rei sub conditione vel modo […] sed 
semper dicitur debitor illius extimationis quam promittit quando se obligat' (ibid., pt. 3, n. 42, fol. 23r). 
The proof that something might be valued at its price at destination was found in the law on jettison 
(the lex Rhodia de iactu, D.14.2.2.4), where the remaining part of the cargo (i.e. that which was not 
jettisoned) is to be reckoned at its value at destination (ibid., pt. 3, n. 40, fol. 22v). 
Santerna's argument was the object of a lengthy critique by Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 
6, n. 2-4, fols. 50v-52v. According to Stracca, Santerna’s conclusions were not compatible with emptio-
venditio (unless moving to emptio spei). For it was possible to shape the susceptio periculi as sale of 
the rei aestimatio so long as the value of the res was reckoned at the moment of the contract. If the sale 
took place at the moment of the insurance, then the value of the thing (the rei aestimatio) would 
necessarily refer to the same time: 'Dixerit aliquis ergo in quaestione proposita spectandum erit 
emptionis tempus, non autem contractae obligationis […] verum dici posset spectari tempus emptionis 
in casu notro non illud quo merces emptae sunt, a dominis, sed quo assecuriationis contractus 
celebratus est, contractus nanque iste (ut non semel dixi) similis est emptioni, et merito inspiciatur 
tempus quo pretio periculum emitur, vel diem tempus contractae obligationis super assecuratione 
spectandum […] ut damnum emendetur ratione contractus super assecuratione, quasi contrahentes ad 
tempus contractae obligationis se retulerint', ibid., n. 3, fol. 52r. Further, argued Stracca, the jettison 
case is conceptually different from insurance, and could not be invoked in support of Santerna's 
interpretation. The jettisoned cargo is reckoned at its cost value, but the part of the cargo which arrives 
safely at destination is valued after the higher price it now commands. The reason, Stracca explained, is 
to share the loss more equally among the merchants involved, for the loss is to be divided among all 
merchants proportionally to the value of their goods. The owners of the safe goods would thus pay 
more than the owners of the jettisoned ones. Thus, the mechanism is based on fairness: since 
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conductio model, short of the obvious sponsio alternative. 
Other attempts to reconcile the emptio-venditio model with the insurability of the 
value at destination resulted in yet more convoluted arguments, or in their complete 
absence. For instance, after having used the same definition as Lessius on insurance 
as emptio-venditio of the rei aestimatio (and so, based on the cost price of the res),98 
Rocco then nonchalantly argued that the insurance could also be considered as emptio 
spei, and so it was possible to give a different value to such spes – the value the cargo 
would have if it reached safely its destination.99 Following Santerna's scheme100 – by 
then, a topos – Scaccia concluded that one thing was to insure the value of the thing, 
another to guarantee the safe arrival of the res at destination.101 Scaccia was however 
aware that the second case looked more as emptio spei and so it could not easily be 
reconciled with the definition of insurance as sale of the rei aestimatio. So he just 
referred the reader to the opinions of Santerna and Stracca – who, incidentally, were 
in open contrast with each other on the point.102 Ansaldi sought to solve the problem 
by using emptio spei without mentioning it overtly. 103  The approaches of Rocco, 
Scaccia and Ansaldi on the insurability of the value at destination highlight the 
underlying legal (and logical) problem. The more the accent fell on the value of the 
goods at destination, the more it moved away from the thing-at-risk.104 Rei aestimatio 
and emptio spei are not fully compatible with each other. More precisely, emptio spei 
is conceptually a case-limit within emptio-venditio: it is not possible to use it as the 
default scenario of a sale agreement – let alone of the contract of insurance – without 
mentioning it expressly. Yet, if one is to rely on emptio spei overtly to justify insuring 
the value at destination, then it is extremely difficult to reconcile its use with the 
standard definition of insurance as (normal) emptio-venditio, based on the sale of the 
rei aestimatio. Trying to use emptio spei in a somewhat furtive way is understandable, 
but it is equally dangerous. In the insurance context, it blurs the difference between 
emptio-venditio and wager.  
 
Qualifying insurance as the sale of the rei aestimatio had its problems.105 By contrast, 
the sponsio scheme perfectly suited the insurability of the value at destination. As 
                                                                                                                                           
jettisoning necessarily entails a discrimination between different goods, some compensation ought to 
be given to the owners of the merchandise sacrificed. The legal (and logical) basis is therefore wholly 
different from that of insurance, and so it cannot be applied by analogy to it (ibid., n. 2-3, fols. 51r-
52r).  
98 Supra, note 40. See further Rocco, note 41, not. 4, n. 8, and not. 6, n. 13, both at p. 394. 
99 Ibid., not. 7, n. 17-18, p. 394: 'quia assecurator vendit tantum spem futuri eventus, quae potest, de 
iure, vendi […] non enim hic aestimatur quantum merces valent in adventu periculi, sed quantum 
aestimaretur dubius ille eventus, quo casu videtur constituti illud pretium respectu illius spei, non 
respectu aestimationis mercium, quando postea evenit.'  
100 Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 40-442, fols. 22v-23r. Cf. e.g. Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 
6, n. 1, fols. 50v-51r; Rocco, note 41, not. 31, n. 100-103, p. 401. 
101 Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1 n. 169, p. 45. Scaccia's reasoning was hardly original – it followed the 
scheme proposed by Santerna (note 25, pt. 3, n. 40-442, fols. 22v-23r) and then used by Stracca (De 
Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6, n. 1, fols. 50v-51r). 
102 Ibid. On the divergence between Santerna and Stracca see supra, note 97. 
103 Ansaldi, note 47, disc. 70, n. 30-31, p. 430. 
104 Cf. Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 40-42, fols. 22v-23r; Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6, n. 
1, fols. 50v-51r. 
105 Another consequence of the rei aestimatio as the object of the insurance-sale became apparent 
only later, with the enormously influential treatise of the Genoese lawyer Giuseppe Maria Casaregis 
(1670-1737). If the object of the insurance was the value of the thing-at-risk and not the insured’s 
interest in it, then only the owner could validly insure. Casaregis, Josephi Laurentii Mariae De 
Casaregis … Discursus Legales de Commercio, Florentiae, apud Jo. Cajetanum Tartinium, & Sanctem 
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Santerna had it, 'if my things were to perish, you will give me a thousand; in such 
case there is no issue’.106 One of the advantages of sponsio was that, as a simple 
wager, no correlation was needed between the wager’s amount and the value of the 
thing-at-risk. Yet, insisting on the abstractness of the wager was not easily 
reconcilable with the attempts of some scholars to shape it as susceptio periculi. If the 
insurance-wager was made ‘because of the periculum that the promisors […] 
accepted’,107 it was difficult to separate the amount of the wager from the value of the 
thing-at-risk. 108  Ultimately, this depended on the ambivalent meaning of pretium 
periculi in the Digest (D.22.2.5 pr.), as we have seen earlier.  
In theory, both locatio-conductio and fideiussio schemes should have been more 
fortunate on the subject of insurability of the value at destination. In both cases the 
accent is on the guarantee, not on the thing-at-risk. It follows that the amount of the 
guarantee does not have to be necessarily the same as the value of the thing. The 
pretium periculi, in other words, could be higher than the rei aestimatio. Effectively, 
this was the case with locatio-conductio: the service undertaken by the conductor was 
to guarantee the safe arrival of the thing. Yet, as we have seen, locatio-conductio was 
the least fortunate contract in terms of advocates, and they did not elaborate much on 
the point. 
The fideiussio scheme should have perfectly suited the insurability of the value at 
destination. If the insurer guaranteed the safe arrival of the thing, then he was 
answerable for the value the thing would have had at destination. However, no 
advocate of the fideiussio scheme said expressly as much. At first sight, the silence 
might appear odd. Yet, it was justified: fideiussio could well cover lucrum cessans in 
general, but not when applied to insurance. In principle, the value of the fideiussio 
could well be higher than that of the underlying debt. The only limit was that, in such 
case, the fideiussor could not swear an oath. For the oath referred to his guarantee of 
the debt, and so it could not exceed its value. Now, fideiussio could be applied to 
insurance so long as the fideiussor did not enjoy the privilege of being asked to pay 
only after the main debtor had defaulted (beneficium excussionis). As the main 
obligor was the thing-at-risk, it was necessary that the fideiussor did not enjoy such 
privilege – lest the entire construction would collapse.109 The problem was that the 
                                                                                                                                           
Franchium, 1719, disc. 4, esp. n. 1, 5 and 9, pp. 23-25.  Admittedly, Casaregis’ was a somewhat drastic 
position, but it soon became authoritative: see e.g. Ascanio Baldasseroni (1751-1824), Delle 
Assicurazioni Marittime, Firenze, Stamperia Bonducciana, 1786, vol. 1, pt. 1, tit. 1, n. 20-25, pp. 34-
37, and pt. 2, tit. 5, n. 7-15, pp. 180-195. Still, it should be noted that most (if not all) of the previous 
jurists seem to have thought of the insured always as the owner or his agent (or at the most as the only 
co-owner who wanted to insure the thing in common: Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 10, n. 
1-8, fols. 63v-66r). 
Earlier authors had not worked out in full the implications of the emptio-venditio scheme. Both 
Santerna and Stracca had simply invoked the freedom to contract without looking at the specific effects 
of the sale scheme (based as it was on ownership) on the capacity to insure. Santerna, note 25, pt. 5, n. 
10-11, fol. 50r-v: ‘non potest assecurator opponere assecurato, quod merces non erant suae 
[assecurati] [...] quia super re aliena quis potest contrahere’; Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, 
gl. 10, n. 5, fol. 65r: qui convenitur ex contractu non potest referre quaestionem Dominij […] agenti ex 
contractu, opponi non posse, quod non sit dominus, vel quod alter sit dominus; quia licet alius sit 
Dominus: tamen contractus consistit’. Cf. Rocco, note 41, not. 46, n. 150-153, p. 405, and not. 94, n. 
365-366, p. 419, and Ansaldi, note 47, disc. 12, n. 3, 5-6, 11-13, 17, p. 62-65.  
106 'Si res meae peribunt, dabis mille, et in hoc casu nulla est dubitatio’, Santerna, note 25, pt. 3, n. 43, 
fol. 23r. Cf. Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6, n. 4, fol. 52v (rightly referring to D.45.1.52); 
Rocco, note 41, not. 32, n. 104, p. 401; Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 1 n. 169, p. 45. 
107 Stracca, supra, note 66. 
108 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 6 n. 4, fols. 52v-53r. 
109 Supra, note 51. 
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beneficium excussionis would apply to the fideiussor unless he swore an oath on the 
guarantee.110 As such, the advocates of the fideiussio scheme prudently overlooked 
the issue of the insurable value. 
 
Another issue was the case of insurance after loss. Rather frequent in practice (often 
the insured did not know when the ship would set sail, or he would become anxious 
about its tidings), insurance after loss was problematic, especially for the emptio-
venditio scheme. For if the thing was already lost, then there was no longer any 
periculum to transfer.111 However, while the jurists agreed that previous knowledge of 
the mishap on the part of the insured avoided the insurance, they were equally clear to 
defend the contract if the parties were ignorant about the ship’s tidings.112 Yet, the 
legal principle did not change according to the knowledge of the mishap. In either 
case, no risk was left. The jurists insisted on the subjective ignorance so to 
compensate for the lack of objective uncertainty. But, in point of law, this would have 
suited more a wager than a contract of sale.113 Within the sale model, it was more a 
case of emptio spei. Ironically, the reason why Stracca dismissed the spes as the 
object of the sale when introducing insurance as emptio-venditio would have now 
suited very well the case of insurance after loss. The reality of the periculum, argued 
Stracca, depends on the existence of the res. Buying the chance that a thing 
materializes (rei spes) is therefore different from buying the pretium periculi. In case 
of emptio spei the pretium does not refer to the (actual) periculum, but rather to the 
thing which might or might not come into existence.114 When dealing with insurance 
after loss, however, Stracca shifted the focus from the actual (and present) risk to the 
                                                 
110  E.g. Antonio Petrucci (1390-1464), Repetitio Solemnis et Perutilis L. I. ff. de iureiurando, 
Helmstadii, ex officina Iacobi Lucij Typographi, 1592, § Sextus Effectus Iuramenti, fols. 53-55, and 
Ippolito de' Marsili (1450-1529), De Fidejussioribus, in Antonius Heringuis, ed., Tractatus de 
Fideiussoribus, Genevae, sumptibus Leonardi Chouër, 1675, n. 291, p. 461. 
111 Leys, note 40, lib. 2, cap. 24, dub. 4, n. 25, p. 324: ‘impossibile enim est praestare periculum rei, 
ubi iam res perijt.’ Representing the insurer, Leeuw, note 86, cons. 22, n. 2-4, 249-250, was more 
elaborate on the point: ‘Assecurationem contractam, aut tempore Assecurationis imminente periculo 
intelligitur, nec ad praeteritum damnum seu periculum extendi potest. Nam praeteriti periculi 
susceptio, ac rerum jam deperditarum, et quas jam periisse (sic) in rerum natura certum est, promissa 
securitas, ex juris communis dispositione nullius momenti esse: tum quia res, ad quam sit securitatis 
promissae relatio, tempore quo sit promissio non existit, aut non est in nostro commercio […] tum quia 
nihil continet praeter aleam ac vanae sponsionis speciem, quae non fundatur super aliqua justa causa, 
sed dumtaxat super inopinata ac inconsulta captione ac supergressione alterius contrahentium, quae 
tanquam Reipublicae damnosa, et ad inconsultos contractus respiciens, a jure non probatur’. 
112 E.g. Leys, note 40, lib. 2, cap. 24, dub. 4, n. 26, p. 324; Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 1 q. 7, pt. 2, ampl. 10, n. 
19-21, p. 331-332.  
113 ‘Assecurationis contractus valeat: sicut in contractu sponsionis […] de re aliqua preterita, satis 
est, si incerta sit utrique contrahentium’, Molina, note 74, pt. 2, disp. 507, n. 3, p. 676. The issue is 
lucidly explained in Johan Locken (Johannes Loccenius, 1598-1677). After a long argument on the 
invalidity of insurance after loss, Loccenius closed the matter simply referring to wager. Shaped as a 
sponsio, no objection would stand against insuring after the mishap. Loccenius, De Iure Maritimo libri 
tres, in F. Stypmann, Scriptorum Iure Nautico et Maritimo Fasciculus, Halae Magdeburgicae, 
sumptibus Orphanotrophei, 1740, lib. 2, ch. 5, n. 9, p. 984. 
114 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, praefatio, n. 13, fol. 13v: ‘Aleam emere, hoc est incertum 
rerum eventum [...] Licet nec emptio nec venditio sine re quae veneat, possit intelligi, aliquando tamen 
sine re venditio intelligitur, veluti cum quasi alea emitur, quod sit cum captus piscium et avium, quia 
spei emptio est. Dum ergo in d. l. periculi [D.22.2.5] dicitur, si modo in speciem aleae non cadat; 
exponendum est, nisi in speciem illam emptionis cadat, incertumque rei eventum. et quod hic fit versus 
sensus, indicant exempla subjecta, et illud maximè, si Piscatori erogaturo in apparatum plurimum 
pecuniae, ut si cepisset, hoc enim casu, seu casibus: quia emitur alea, hoc est spes rei, non dicitur 
periculi pretium, sed rei non existentis, et rei quae in spe est emptio.’ Cf. supra, note 97. 
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abstract possibility of mishap (that is, from periculum to eventus).115 In the ignorance 
of the parties, he claimed, the eventus would still remain possible despite it referred to 
the past. From a legal standpoint, the argument was not entirely persuading, for it 
implicitly moved from emptio-venditio (even of just a spes) to wager. 116  Scaccia 
realised the problem but could not avoid it entirely. It is possible to insist on the 
eventus downplaying the existence of the actual periculum only if the existence of the 
object is itself aleatory. Hence, Scaccia argued for the validity of insurance after loss 
by considering the thing-at-risk as ‘res incerta et dubia’.117 The argument is based on 
the similarity between wager and insurance so as to extend the broader scope of the 
former to the latter. But it does not offer any logical reason for the analogy, all the 
more given the wholly different juridical structure of the two contracts.118 Worse, it 
seems to blur the difference between emptio periculi (referring to an existing thing) 
and emptio spei, creating a sort of emptio periculi sperati. Which, needless to say, 
went entirely against Scaccia's own definition of the object of insurance as the 
undertaking to pay for the value of the thing-at-risk (‘obligat[io] ad solvendum rei 
aestimationem’).119 
The case of insurance after safe arrival was symmetrical with that of insurance after 
loss, so it presented the same problem. Arguing for the invalidity of the contract in 
case the insurer had previous knowledge of the safe arrival of the ship, the advocates 
of the emptio-venditio scheme insisted on the lack of objective periculum. The 
insurance is void, wrote Leys, ‘because the obligation undertaken by [the insurer] is 
worthless’.120 Yet, by the same token, the obligation undertaken after the res had 
already perished (the insurance after loss) should have similarly been considered 
worthless. The only author coherent on the point was Rocco, who reached the same 
conclusion (on the lawfulness of the policy) both for insurance after departure and 
                                                 
115 Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 27, n. 4, fol. 110r: ‘incertus namque dubiusque eventus 
emitur et periculi precium in re incerta praestatur.’ 
116 Ibid., gl. 27, n. 5-6, fols. 120v-121r. It is particularly interesting to note that Stracca, subtle jurist as 
he was, does not offer a legal argument in support of his conclusion, but relies only on customs and 
fairness. He was hardly the only one: see e.g. de Ripoll, note 47, ch. 21, n. 80-82, p. 225. 
117 Scaccia, note 36, § 1, q. 7, pt. 2 ampl. 10, n. 21, p. 332. 
118 Ibid., n. 21-22, p. 332: 'assecuratio et sponsio in substantia conveniunt […] Sed sponsio potest fieri 
de re incerta, et dubia, tam si sit de re dubia futura […] quam si sit de re dubia praesenti, vel 
praeterita […] quia sponsio est species ludi […] sed ludus ex sui natura ita potest esse de re futura, 
sicut de re praeterita: admitto tamen, quod in sponsione de re praeterita, vel praesenti facilius 
committi potest fraus, quam in sponsione de re futura. Ergo etiam assecuratio potest fieri de re 
praeterita; et ita servatur, quia sufficit, risicum semel extitisse.' What is interesting to observe is that 
Scaccia’s discussion about insuring something which might not exist is divided in two cases. The first 
is about the validity of the insurance after loss, the second whether the insurance on a larger quantity of 
merchandise than that effectively laden onboard is valid. The first issue is dealt with in a few lines, 
then the author moves immediately to the second, dealing with it for several pages (ibid., esp. n. 22-38, 
p. 332-336). Of course also this second issue was important, but far easier to solve in law. The whole 
arrangement leaves the reader with the clear impression that the author was trying to shift the subject to 
something easier to discuss. Moving from the premise that both issues stemmed from the same legal 
problem and focusing on the second with long and erudite juridical arguments, the entire problem 
would hopefully look satisfactorily concluded.  
119 Supra, note 41. 
120 Leys, note 40, lib. 2, cap. 24, dub. 4, n. 24, p. 324, ‘quia obligatio, quam in se suscipit, nullius est 
pretij.’ Molina went further: since the premium depends on the periculum, there has to be some 
proportionality between the two. Hence, if the insurer knew that the ship was close to destination (but 
not yet arrived), he ought to return part of the premium because of the lower risk. Molina, note 74, pt. 
2, disp. 507, n. 3, p. 676. 
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insurance after safe arrival.121 But Rocco’s coherence came at the price of a higher 
incongruity – his easiness to move from proper emptio-venditio to emptio spei.  
The list of insurance-related matters hard to reconcile with Civil law could 
continue,122 but listing them all was not our purpose. Incongruities aside, abstract 
contractual schemes had also other problems: they were too broad. For instance, it 
was difficult to argue for the exclusion of the fraud of the shipmaster (barratry), even 
though in practice barratry was included in the policy only if expressly agreed upon. 
From a legal perspective, the shipmaster was a third party. His liability therefore was 
not a defence for the insurer to avoid paying the insured.123  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Accusing some among the most brilliant legal minds in early modern Europe of poor 
understanding of basic legal principles would be ridiculous. They must have realised 
the possible objections to their theories. But the only way to avoid such objections 
would have been to reconsider the legal models applied to insurance. Faced with this 
trade-off, they showed no hesitation in keeping the abstract model. And yet, when 
looking at practical issues arising in insurance matters, they were equally ready to 
detach themselves from those abstractions. It would seem that they considered the two 
subjects somewhat independent of each other. First came the need to provide a Civil 
law scheme for the insurance contract. Then, having secured this new business 
practice on safe ground, Civilians proceeded to analyse practical issues arising in a 
more down-to-earth fashion.  
If there is a lesson to be learned, it might be not to take too seriously those abstract 
theorisations: their authors were the first not to do so. Modern scholars’ interest in the 
arguments of early modern jurists on insurance is perfectly understandable, even 
commendable. So long as this interest does not lead, as it often happened, to a sort of 
quasi-irrebuttable presumption on the correspondence between those arguments and 
coeval commercial reality.  
                                                 
121 Rocco, note 41, not. 51, n. 175-179, p. 406-407. 
122 One of the many other examples that could be made is the so-called ‘sue and labour’ clause, which 
allowed the insured to recover and preserve the cargo at the insurers’ expenses in case of mishap. Such 
expenses were met for the safety of the thing-at-risk: it was only fair that the insurers would reimburse 
the insured. So, for instance, the case of ransom paid by the insured was relatively easy to solve. As 
capture by pirates was one of the risks insured against, the insurer ought to refund the payment effected 
by the insured. See e.g. Santerna, note 25, pt. 4, n. 26-27, fols. 38r-v, and Rocco, note 41, not. 55, n. 
191, p. 408. Cf. C.M. Moschetti, “Caso Fortuito, Pagamento del Nolo e Risarcimento dei Danni, in Id., 
Caso Fortuito, Trasporto Marittimo e Assicurazione nella Giurisprudenza Napoletana del Seicento, 
Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 149. The problem was for the case in which the expenses were 
made so to prevent the loss or damage of the thing – and so to avoid the risk from materialising. Not 
only there was a problem of causality there, but also the legal basis for the insurer's liability was less 
obvious, and - moreover - considerably more difficult to fit within the emptio-venditio scheme. 
Ironically, it would have been easier to hold the insurer responsible going back to Bosco's scheme of 
insurance as sale of the thing. It seems quite telling that the only reference to Roman law that Rocco 
was able to find on the issue was D.3.5.20(21) pr., substantially a case on the liability of the promissor 
against his guarantors. The parallel (considering the insured as the insurer's guarantor) is somewhat 
paradoxical. Rocco, note 41, not. 70, n. 259, p. 413. 
123 See the long discussion in Santerna, note 25, pt. 4, n. 18-25, fols. 36r-38r, ultimately leading to the 
scheme 'si facto venditoris, ipse tenetur emptori; si emptoris, ipse venditor; si tertii, pertinet ad 
emptorem’ (ibid., pt. 5, n. 9,  fol. 50r). Cf. Stracca, De Assecurationibus, note 39, gl. 20, n. 3, fols. 
113v-114r; Scaccia, note 36, ∫ 1, q. 1, n. 155, p. 42; Barbosa, note 85, ad C.4.33.4, § Cum proponas, n. 
1, fol. 153r. 
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It is important to notice that opting for the innominate contract facio ut des would 
have been considerably less problematic than any nominate one. Nearly all Civilians 
used it to describe the practical working of insurance, but not to define its legal 
features. Their preference for nominate contracts is intriguing: if they saw the limits 
of emptio-venditio, locatio-conductio or fideiussio, then why not content themselves 
with an innominate contract? Short of classifying early modern Civilians as proto-
Pandectists, there might be two answers to that.  
The first is to be found in the old problem of the legitimacy of insurance. It would be 
easy to dismiss the interminable discussions on the problem as a literary topos. In 
part, it might have been the case. But the treatises we have examined were not meant 
as academic divertissements. They were precious guides for practitioners and high 
courts alike. What is not always taken into account is that the decretal Naviganti 
targeted expressly the susceptio periculi: no premium was allowed despite the fact 
that the lender-insurer bore the risk in the thing ('pro eo, quod suscipit in se 
periculum').124 It is doubtful whether the decretal was still scrupulously applied in law 
courts. But this does not mean that Civilians could dismiss it, as Naviganti still stood 
as a juridical obstacle to their task. The issue was considerably thornier than it would appear in 
most of modern literature. It was a problem of law, not of morality.125 Defending the legitimacy 
of insurance was thus a precondition to its legal analysis.  
The second and more important reason lies in the dissatisfaction with innominate 
contracts, which were considered residual categories, and in the deeply entrenched 
habit of thinking in terms of nominate contracts. The long list of rules elaborated by 
the doctrine, and then also the case law of high courts, were both thought for – and so 
applicable to - particular kinds of contracts. But always nominate ones. Opting for an 
innominate contract to explain a new type of agreement would have precluded the 
applicability of all those rules. It is true that the new instrument was so different from 
most standard contracts that not all those rules would have been applicable to it. Still, 
reasoning by categories of contracts was too entrenched in the mind of jurists. If the 
new contract were to be taken seriously, a proper legal clothing ought to be found for 
it. And this could mean only a nominate contract. Also, and more deeply, finding the 
legal basis of insurance in a facio ut des contract would have meant creating new law. 
The rules immediately applicable to innominate contracts were few. Moving from 
general principles to ad hoc agrements could have suited some moral theologians 
(and, later, natural lawyers), but not Civil lawyers.126 At least, not lawyers operating 
within – and thinking in terms of – mos italicus. Emerigon’s contempt of those ‘mind-
fatiguing’ dissertations is perfectly justified, but it misses the point entirely.  
                                                 
124 Supra, note 6.  
125 The moral objections raised by most of the authors often studied by modern scholars (see e.g. Pesce, 
note 2, 47-51) were easily dismissed, but not so the underlying legal issue. One of the best summaries 
of most coeval literature on the point may be found in Joseph Gibalin (1592-1671), Iosephi Gibalini ... 
De Vsuris, Commerciis, déque aequitate et vsu fori Lugdunensis ... tractatio bipartita ..., Lvdgvni, 
Sumpt. Phil Borde, Laur. Arnaud, et Cl. Rigaud, 1657, lib. 2, cap. 4, art. 3, n. 16-26 , p. 246-250. As 
any other jurist, Gibalin eschewed open confrontation with the old dilemma highlighted by Sinibaldo 
de Fieschi. Rather, he opted for a number of restrictions and indirect attacks. 
126 With hindsight, the case of insurance seems to show one of the underlying reasons for the shift 
towards a general contractual scheme: the tension between enduring reliance on nominate contracts and 
the progressive realisation of their structural limits.  
